The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1551-1553 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1551-1553.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अस्तु वा वस्तु सादृश्यं तत्तु सामान्यवद्गवि ।
प्रतियोगिन्यदृष्टेऽपि दृष्टमेव पुरःस्थितम् ॥ १५५१ ॥
तथाच स्मृतिरूपत्वं न कथञ्चिन्निवर्त्तते ।
सत्तामात्रेण विज्ञातं सादृश्यं च गवात्मनि ॥ १५५२ ॥
गवयेन तु सादृश्यमित्येवं न विनिश्चितम् ।
प्रमिणोत्युपमानं तु वैलक्षण्यं ततः स्मृतेः ॥ १५५३ ॥

astu vā vastu sādṛśyaṃ tattu sāmānyavadgavi |
pratiyoginyadṛṣṭe'pi dṛṣṭameva puraḥsthitam || 1551 ||
tathāca smṛtirūpatvaṃ na kathañcinnivarttate |
sattāmātreṇa vijñātaṃ sādṛśyaṃ ca gavātmani || 1552 ||
gavayena tu sādṛśyamityevaṃ na viniścitam |
pramiṇotyupamānaṃ tu vailakṣaṇyaṃ tataḥ smṛteḥ || 1553 ||

Or, similarity may be an entity, residing in the cow, like the commonalty (or universal); even so, it will have been perceived in the cow standing before the person before he sees the co-relative (gavaya); and as such the cognition of the said similarity following upon the seeing of the gavaya cannot escape from being of the nature of remembrance.—[says the other party]—“What has been previously seen in the cow is similarity merely existing there, and it has not been definitely ascertained that it is similarity to the gavaya; while this latter is what is apprehended by analogical cognition, which, thus, is different from remembrance.”—(1551-1553)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Taking for granted that Similarity is an entity, the Author proceeds to show that, even according to the view of the Mīmāṃsaka, Analogical Cognition cannot be valid:—[see verses 1551-1553 above]

There may be a real entity in the shape of Similarity; and it may be residing in everything in its entirety.—But even so, when, before seeing the Gavaya, the man sees the Cow standing before him, he naturally sees the Similarity which is inseparable from the Cow; otherwise the inseparability of the two could not be there.—And thus, as the subsequent Analogical Cognition would be apprehending only what has been already apprehended, it would not be a form of valid Cognition.

The following argument might be urged:—“The Similarity seen previously was merely as existing, it was not seen in the form that ‘this is the similarity between this Gavaya and the Cow’; while this is the form in which the Similarity is apprehended by Analogical Cognition; so that it cannot be regarded as being of the nature of Remembrance”.—(1551-1553)

The answer to this last argument is provided in the following:—[see verse 1554 next]

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: