Verse 1547-1549

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

एवं तु युज्यते तत्र गोरूपावयवैः सह ।
गवयावयवाः केचित्तुल्यप्रत्ययहेतवः ॥ १५४७ ॥
तत्रास्य गवये दृष्टे स्मृतिः समुपजायते ।
असकृत् दृष्टपूर्वेषु गोरूपावयवेष्वियम् ॥ १५४८ ॥
अतएव तुरङ्गादौ तत्सादृश्येन नो मतिः ।
वर्त्तते गवये दृष्टे को विशेषोऽन्यथा पुनः ॥ १५४९ ॥

evaṃ tu yujyate tatra gorūpāvayavaiḥ saha |
gavayāvayavāḥ kecittulyapratyayahetavaḥ || 1547 ||
tatrāsya gavaye dṛṣṭe smṛtiḥ samupajāyate |
asakṛt dṛṣṭapūrveṣu gorūpāvayaveṣviyam || 1548 ||
ataeva turaṅgādau tatsādṛśyena no matiḥ |
varttate gavaye dṛṣṭe ko viśeṣo'nyathā punaḥ || 1549 ||

What happens in this case is that there are some parts in the gavaya’s body which bring about cognitions similar to those brought about by the parts of the cow’s body;—hence when the gavaya is seen, there follows the remembrance of the parts of the cow’s body that have been seen before repeatedly. It is for this reason that, there does not arise any idea of the horse and other animals, through that similarity,—but it does arise when the gavaya is seen. otherwise, if there were no such remembrance, what would be the difference (between the case of the cow and that of the horse)?—(1547-1549)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Further, because it is of the nature of Remembrance, therefore, being like any other Remembrance, Analogical Cognition cannot be a valid form of Cognition. The following Texts explain how Analogical Cognition is of the nature of Remembrance:—[see verses 1547-1549 above]

In its essence, there is no such thing as Similarity; all that is there is that there are some parts in the Gavaya’s body which bring about the same conceptual notions as certain parts of the cow’s body; and similarity is not any distinct entity, apart, from the said parts which give rise to the same conceptions; that this is so is clear from the fact that nothing apart from these figures in the conception at all. Hence what happens is that on the perception of the Gavaya, there arises a cognition in regard to the parts of the Cow’s body, on account of the repeated perception of these latter in the past; and this cognition that arises is of the nature of Remembrance,—and it is not a distinct cognition apprehending a distinct entity in the shape of Similarity.—If it were not so, then, in regard to the Horse and other animals also,—as the presence of the manifold commonalty of component parts is there,—why should not the idea of these other animals appear on the seeing of the Gavaya, in the way as it does in regard to the Cow? There is no difference between the two cases, some degree of similarity being present in both cases.

‘Otherwise’,—i.e. if the parts of the cow’s body had not been seen repeatedly.

In the case of the resultant cognition being of the nature of Remembrance, this difficulty does not arise; as the Remembrance appears in regard to that same thing which has been repeatedly seen before; as the causes that bring about Remembrance are restricted in their scope.—(1547-1519)