The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1543-1545 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1543-1545.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

प्रमेयवस्त्वभावेन नाभिप्रेताऽस्य मानता ।
भूयोऽवयवसामान्ययोगः सादृश्यमस्ति चेत् ॥ १५४३ ॥
सामान्यानि निरस्तानि भूयस्ता तेषु सा कुतः ।
तैश्च योगः प्रमाणं चेदस्ति तत्प्रतिपादकम् ॥ १५४४ ॥
सामान्यस्य च वस्तुत्वं प्रत्यक्षग्राह्यताऽपि च ।
अभावान्यप्रमेयत्वादसाधारणवस्तुवत् ॥ १५४५ ॥

prameyavastvabhāvena nābhipretā'sya mānatā |
bhūyo'vayavasāmānyayogaḥ sādṛśyamasti cet || 1543 ||
sāmānyāni nirastāni bhūyastā teṣu sā kutaḥ |
taiśca yogaḥ pramāṇaṃ cedasti tatpratipādakam || 1544 ||
sāmānyasya ca vastutvaṃ pratyakṣagrāhyatā'pi ca |
abhāvānyaprameyatvādasādhāraṇavastuvat || 1545 ||

As there is no object that could be cognised by this means, it cannot be regarded as a means of cognition.—It might be urged that—“there is the connection of the manifold commonalty of component parts, which is what is cognised”.—But commonalty itself haying been rejected, how could there be any manifoldness in regard to it? How too could there be any ‘connection’ with such manifold ‘commonalty’? [says the opponent]—“There is a means of cognition which brings about the cognition of such commonalty, in the form of the inference that—commonalty is an entity and is apprehended by sense-perception, because it is cognisable as something other than negation,—like the unique entity”.—[the answer to this follows in the following text 1545.]—(1543-1545)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Analogy cannot be a Means of Cognition, because there is nothing that is cognised by means of it,—and hence it is like any Means other than the six (that are accepted by the Mīmāṃsaka).

“But there is similarity, consisting in the presence of the manifold commonalty of component parts, which is cognised by its means; lienee the Reason adduced (by the Buddhist) is ‘inadmissible’.”

It is not so; in course of our examination of Commonalty (Universal), all commonalties have been rejected; how then can there be any ‘manifoldness of Commonalties’? Nor is connection of Commonalties possible. Hence our Reason cannot be said to be ‘Inadmissible’.

The following might be urged:—“There is a Means of Cognition which establishes the existence of the Commonalty. Hence your Reason remains inadmissible. The said Means of Gognition is as follows—‘The Commonalty is an entity’,—and ‘it is apprehensible by Sense-perception’,—these are the two Propositions; the Reason (Premiss) is, ‘because it is something cognisable, other than Negation’; that is to say, it is cognisable as something which has a character other than ‘non-existence’;—‘the unique entity’ is the Corroborative Instance; the specific Individuality of things is the ‘unique entity’,”—(1543-1545)

The answer to the above argument is provided in the following—[see verse 1546 next]

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