The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1538-1540 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1538-1540.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

नहि प्रत्यक्षतासिद्धं विज्ञानस्योपपद्यते ।
इन्द्रियार्थाभिसम्बन्धव्यापारविरहात्तदा ॥ १५३८ ॥
त्रैरूप्यानुपपत्तेश्च नच तस्यानुमानता ।
पक्षधर्मादि नैवात्र कथञ्चिदवकल्पते ॥ १५३९ ॥
(प्राग्गोगतं हि सादृश्यं न) धर्मत्वेन गृह्यते ।
गवये गृह्यमाणं च न गवामनुमापकम् ॥ १५४० ॥

nahi pratyakṣatāsiddhaṃ vijñānasyopapadyate |
indriyārthābhisambandhavyāpāravirahāttadā || 1538 ||
trairūpyānupapatteśca naca tasyānumānatā |
pakṣadharmādi naivātra kathañcidavakalpate || 1539 ||
(prāggogataṃ hi sādṛśyaṃ na) dharmatvena gṛhyate |
gavaye gṛhyamāṇaṃ ca na gavāmanumāpakam || 1540 ||

“(a) Analogical cognition cannot be regarded as sense-perception,—because it is entirely devoid of the functioning of the senses. (b) Nor can it be regarded as inference, because the ‘three-features’ are not there; for instance, there is no probans here (which subsists in the subject); and the similarity of the cow (to the gavaya) has not been previously cognised as subsisting in the subject; and the similarity that is perceived in the gavaya cannot bring about the inference of the cow.”—(1538-1540)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It might be asked—Even if Analogy be a Means of Cognition,—in what way is it distinct from Sense -perception and the rest?

The Answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 1538-1540 above]

It cannot be right to regard the cognition in. question as Perception, because it is not brought about by the contact of the senses.

Nor can it be regarded as Inference; as the ‘Three Features’ are absent. For instance, what would be the ‘property of the Subject’, i.e. the Probans?—the similarity?—or the Gavaya that is seen? If the similarity were taken to be the Probans, would it be the similarity in the Cow?—or that in the Gavaya? These are the only two alternatives possible.—Now the similarity residing in such cognisable things as the Cow and the like cannot serve as the Probans, because, prior to the perception of the Gavaya, that similarity has not been apprehended; and what has not been apprehended cannot serve as the Probans; if it did, it would lead to absurdities.—‘Then it is the Similarity residing in the Gavaya that could serve as the Probans, because this similarity is apprehended when the Gavaya is seen—The answer to that is that what is perceived in the Gavaya cannot bring about the Inference of the Cow; as there is no co-ordination between them; just as there is none between the Cow and the blackness (perceived elsewhere).—(1539-1540)

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: