Verse 1518-1519

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

वैलक्ष्यण्येन हेतूनां विशेषं तासु ये न तु ।
अवगच्छन्ति दोषोऽयं तेषां लिङ्गस्य नास्ति तु ॥ १५१८ ॥
सन्दिह्यमानवपुषो धूमस्याप्येकदाऽन्यथा ।
भावान्निश्चयकालेऽपि न स्यात्तेजसि लिङ्गता ॥ १५१९ ॥

vailakṣyaṇyena hetūnāṃ viśeṣaṃ tāsu ye na tu |
avagacchanti doṣo'yaṃ teṣāṃ liṅgasya nāsti tu || 1518 ||
sandihyamānavapuṣo dhūmasyāpyekadā'nyathā |
bhāvānniścayakāle'pi na syāttejasi liṅgatā || 1519 ||

Difference among words is due to difference among their causes.—If there are people who do not notice this difference, the fault is theirs, not of the indicative.—Otherwise, the fact of mere suspected smoke not having for once brought about the true notion of fire,—might lead to the conclusion that even when cognised with certainty, smoke cannot be a true indicative of fire.—(1518-1519)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

That is to say, the difference is due to the difference in the Causes. Consequently, when the effect has been duly pondered over, it is never found to be non-concomitant with its Cause; so that the Word does become the means of knowing the particular ‘Intention of the Speaker

If some people however are unable to perceive any difference in the words that appear as indicatives (of the meaning),—the fault lies with these people themselves,—not with the Indicative (word). Because the Indication does not indicate the meaning by its mere presence,—it does so only when it is duly ascertained. Hence the fault lies with the person addressed.

If it were not so, then, if in a case where the presence of Smoke has been merely suspected in what was really only vapour,—and hence later on it is found that the Fire indicated by it is not there, and it has failed to indicate the true Fire,—it may lead one to the conclusion that even in cases where the Smoke has been duly cognised with certainty, it would not be indicative of the True Fire.

Further, when the entire fabric of verbal usage is regarded as illusory, being dependent solely upon mere semblances,—like the idea of ‘Two Moons’ that the man of defective vision has,—how could the charge of being invalid be brought, on the basis of falsity only, against the notion of the particular ‘Intention of the Speaker’? Specially when real validity is not attributed to the idea of that particular ‘Intention This has been thus declared—‘When Verbal Cognition was declared to be Inferential, it was with a view to its indicativeness being dependent upon Convention, and not with a view to the real truth’.—(1518-1519)