Verse 1504-1507

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अर्थप्रतीतितो नो चेदेषा व्याख्यानतो भवेत् ।
स्वतन्त्रो हि पुमान्दृष्टो व्याचक्षाणोऽर्थमिच्छया ॥ १५०४ ॥
भूतार्थद्योतने शक्तिः प्रकृत्यैव स्थिताऽस्य चेत् ।
अज्ञातसमयस्यापि भवेदर्थगतिस्ततः ॥ १५०५ ॥
प्रकृत्या दीपको दीपो न सङ्केतमपेक्षते ।
समयान्तरभावे च तस्मादर्थान्तरे गतिः ॥ १५०६ ॥
नहि सङ्केतभावेऽपि दीपो गन्धरसादिकम् ।
प्रकाशयति विज्ञातुं सा शक्तिर्नच शक्यते ॥ १५०७ ॥

arthapratītito no cedeṣā vyākhyānato bhavet |
svatantro hi pumāndṛṣṭo vyācakṣāṇo'rthamicchayā || 1504 ||
bhūtārthadyotane śaktiḥ prakṛtyaiva sthitā'sya cet |
ajñātasamayasyāpi bhavedarthagatistataḥ || 1505 ||
prakṛtyā dīpako dīpo na saṅketamapekṣate |
samayāntarabhāve ca tasmādarthāntare gatiḥ || 1506 ||
nahi saṅketabhāve'pi dīpo gandharasādikam |
prakāśayati vijñātuṃ sā śaktirnaca śakyate || 1507 ||

If it be urged that—“a certain meaning is actually comprehended from words, hence they cannot be inexpressive or useless”,—then (the answer is that) such comprehension can only be derived from explanations provided; and in the matter of explanations, it is found that the expounder is free to explain things as he likes.—It might be argued that—“the word, by its very nature, has the potency to denote well-established things”.—In that case, its meaning would be comprehended also by one who has no knowledge of the convention (bearing upon the word and its denotation). Further, the lamp, which is illuminative by its very nature, does not need a convention (in illumining things). Lastly, as there is another convention also (bearing upon the same word), there could be no comprehension of that other thing from that same word. Even though there be a convention, the lamp cannot manifest odour, taste, etc.—Nor can any such potency (of words) be recognised.—(1504-1507)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

‘No cet’—i.e. If it be urged that—“words cannot be inexpressive; and hence the conclusion of the Buddhist is contrary to a perceived fact”.

The answer to this is that our conclusion would really be contrary to perceived facts if things were comprehended from the Veda itself, without the help of any instructions; as a matter of fact however, the comprehension of the meaning comes only through the help of the expounder relying upon Conventions (the conventional denotation of words); and it never comes from the Veda itself independently of Convention. For instance, the Mīmāṃsaka and others have been found to expound the meaning of the Veda in accordance with their own whim; and it cannot be right for the natural denotation of words to be dependent upon the whim of man.

The following might be urged—“The man does not expound a new meaning through his whim; he explains that same natural meaning of words which has been there all along. So that your conclusion is clearly contrary to this perceived fact.”’

If that is so, and if the potency to express well-established things is already there in the Veda by its very nature,—then it should be possible for that meaning of the Veda to be comprehended by that man also who is ignorant of the Conventions.

Says the Opponent—“The Veda becomes a means of expressing things only through the help of the Conventions,—not independently by itself

That cannot be right. The Lamp and such things which are by their nature endowed with the potency to illumine things, do not need any Conventions. If this were not so, then, through positive and negative concomitance, the potency to express things would have to be attributed to those Conventions, not to any natural relationship (between the word and its meaning).

Then again, the comprehension of the meaning may follow from the Veda as helped by Conventions; even so, the view of the opponent would be defective. This is what is shown by the words—‘As there is another Convention, etc. etc.’—The Conventions set up by the author of the Nirukta are different from those set up by the Mīmāṃsaka; and as there is this other Convention,—this latter could not bring about the comprehension of any meaning other than that indicated by itself; for the Lamp never illumines what cannot be illuminated by it—such, for instance, as Odour, Taste and so forth,—with the help of Conventions.

Even granting that, on the ground of the other Convention, the Word may be applicable to (and lead to the comprehension of) another thing,—no validity could attach to the cognition thus brought about.—This is what is meant by the words—‘Nor can any such potency be recognised—If, through the speaker’s whim, a word be actually applied to another thing (in another sense),—then, there would be confusion, and it would not be possible to ascertain the exact expressive Potency of the word; how then could it be possible to derive from it the cognition of the intended meaning?

Or, the words of the text may be explained in another way:—The natural expressiveness of the word may be either restricted to one thing, or applied to several things;—only these two alternative views are possible. If it is restricted to one thing, then the objection (to the Opponent’s view") is that—‘As there is another Convention, etc. etc.’.—If the second alternative is accepted then—‘no such potency can be recognised’,—i.e. on account of confusion.

This has been thus declared—‘If words are restricted to one thing, then there could be no comprehension of any other thing (from it); if they are related to several things, then there is possibility of the contradictory things being expressed’.—(1504-1507)