The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1501 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1501.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

शक्ताशक्तस्वभावस्य सर्वदा ह्यनुवर्त्तनात् ।
तदा तद्भाविविज्ञानं भवेन्नो वा कदाचन ॥ १५०१ ॥

śaktāśaktasvabhāvasya sarvadā hyanuvarttanāt |
tadā tadbhāvivijñānaṃ bhavenno vā kadācana || 1501 ||

The sentence may be ‘capable’ or ‘incapable’; in either case, as the character would be always there, the cognition resulting therefrom would come about (always); or it would not come about at all.—(1501)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Question:—“Why can there be no eternal Sentence?”

Answer:—[see verse 1501 above]

The ‘eternal Sentence’ may be ‘capable’—of bringing about the cognition,—or ‘incapable’ at times; these two alternatives are possible. In the former case, as the said ‘capability’ would be always there, the Cognition resulting from it would be always there. This argument may be formulated as follows:—When a thing has its capacity to produce something unobstructed, it must always produce that thing,—as for example, the final causal conditions,—the eternal Sentence has its capacity to produce verbal cognition unobstructed at all times,—hence this is a Reason based upon the very nature of the thing. Or it may be formulated as follows:—That effect whose cause is present in its perfect condition must come about,—e.g. the sprout, whose cause (in the shape of the seed, the soil and the requisite moisture) is present in its perfect condition;—the Cognition resulting from the eternal Sentence has its cause always present in its perfect condition;—hence this is a Reason based upon the very nature of the thing.

Under the other alternative—that the eternal Sentence is incapable (of bringing about cognition),—as the said ‘incapability’ would be there always, any cognition resulting from it would never come about at all,—just like the sprout whose cause is imperfect.—(1501)

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