Verse 1496-1497

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

न तावत्तत्र देशेऽसौ न तत्काले च गम्यते ।
भवेन्नित्यविभुत्वाच्चेत्सर्वशब्देषु तत्समम् ॥ १४९६ ॥
तेन सर्वत्र दृष्टत्वाद्व्यतिरेकस्य चागतेः ।
सर्वशब्दैरशेषार्थप्रतिपत्तिः प्रसज्यते ॥ १४९७ ॥

na tāvattatra deśe'sau na tatkāle ca gamyate |
bhavennityavibhutvāccetsarvaśabdeṣu tatsamam || 1496 ||
tena sarvatra dṛṣṭatvādvyatirekasya cāgateḥ |
sarvaśabdairaśeṣārthapratipattiḥ prasajyate || 1497 ||

“It does not exist at the place (where the word is); nor at the time.—If it he urged that the required concomitance would be there in view of the eternality and the all-pervasive character (of the word)”,—then [the answer is that] that would be so with all words; and for that same reason the concomitance being perceived in all cases, there would be no idea of the negative concomitance at all; and it would thus be possible for all words to provide the cognition of all things.”—(1496-1497)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

“The Thing (spoken of) does not exist at the place that is occupied by the Word; for instance, the word ‘Dates’ is heard in one place—the city of Pāṭaliputra for instance,—and yet the thing,—the dates themselves—do not exist there. Nor again is the Thing necessarily present at the time that the word is present; for instance, the word ‘Dilīpa’ is present (uttered) now, while the person of that name lived long ago; and while the word ‘Mahāsammata’ is present now, what it denotes is to come in future.—Under the circumstances, how can there be concomitance between words and the things denoted by them?

“The following might be urged—‘Words are eternal and as such exist at all times; so that things denoted by them cannot exist at a time other than that of the Word; nor can they exist at a place other than that occupied by the words, as being all-pervading in character, words are present at all places. Thus, by reason of their eternality and all-pervasive character, there would be concomitance between the Words and the Things denoted by them’.

“If that be so, then, such eternality and all-pervasiveness belong to all words equally; and hence it should not be the case that particular words should denote particular things only; in fact, any single word should denote all things, as all things would be present at the place and at the time at which the Word is present.

‘The negative concomitance—i.e. the absence of the Probans wherever there is absence of the Probandum.

‘There would be no idea’—no apprehension; for the same reason that words are eternal and all-pervading.—(1496-1497)