The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1485-1486 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1485-1486.

Verse 1485-1486

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अनुमानं प्रमाणं चेद्वक्तुचेच्चक्रुर्न वचनात्मकम् ।
प्रकाशयति तेनायं यथा तद्वदिदं भवेत् ॥ १४८५ ॥
अज्ञातार्थाप्रकाशत्वादप्रमाणं तदिष्यते ।
नवक्तुःनाशक्तसूचकत्वेन तावकीनं तथा नतुननु ॥ १४८६ ॥

anumānaṃ pramāṇaṃ cedvaktuceccakrurna vacanātmakam |
prakāśayati tenāyaṃ yathā tadvadidaṃ bhavet || 1485 ||
ajñātārthāprakāśatvādapramāṇaṃ tadiṣyate |
navaktuḥnāśaktasūcakatvena tāvakīnaṃ tathā natunanu || 1486 ||

“Inference, consisting of a verbal statement, is not a means of knowledge for the speaker; he only conveys the idea to the other party by means of the statement.”—(1485)

A certain means of knowledge is held to be not a means of knowledge only when it does not bring about the cognition of what is not already known; as for instance, the inference that you have put forward, which conveys no idea to the speaker.—(1486)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Aviddhakarṇa has argued thus in the Tattvaṭīkā:—“It may be asked—‘By means of this Means of Knowledge (Inference), what is the idea that is conveyed to the other person? It is only what is admitted by both parties (the Speaker and the person addressed) that can convey any idea’.—But this is not right. Because Inference is in the form of a verbal statement; and it is not a Means of Right Cognition for the person making the statement; and yet that person conveys the idea (expressed) to the other person; as his sole effort is towards the conveying of the idea to that other person; hence the Means need not be admitted by both parties”.

This is the view put forward in the following—[see verse 1485 above]

He’—i.e. the Speaker.

Tena’—by means of the Inference consisting of the verbal statement.

The above view is controverted in the following—[see verse 1486 above]

When a statement is said to be ‘not a Means of Knowledge’, it is not because, it conveys the idea to the Speaker,—but because it does not convey any information that is not already known. As regards conveying the idea tṇ the Speaker, it is of course there. In the case of your Inference (argument) on the other hand, it conveys no idea to the Speaker. Hence the two cases are not analogous.—Otherwise, what is urged would be something admitted by both parties.

From all this it follows that that Means of Knowledge which is not devoid of reason must be accepted by all parties as a Means of Right Cognition,—just like Sense-perception.—(1486)

End of Chapter (18) on Inference.

End of Volume I.

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