Verse 1463-1467

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

परार्थमनुमानं तु न मानं वक्रपेक्षया ।
अनुवादान्न तेनासौ स्वयमर्थं प्रपद्यते ॥ १४६३ ॥
श्रोतृव्यपेक्षयाऽप्येतत्स्वार्थमेवोपपद्यते ।
श्रोत्रदर्शनमूलायाः को विशेषो हि संविदः ॥ १४६४ ॥
न परार्थानुमानत्वं वचसः श्रोत्रपेक्षया ।
श्रोतृसन्तानविज्ञानहेतुत्वज्ञापकत्वतः ॥ १४६५ ॥
यथेन्द्रियस्य साक्षाच्च नानुमेयप्रकाशनम् ।
तस्मादस्याविनाभावसम्बन्धज्ञानवन्न तत् ॥ १४६६ ॥
अथोच्यते परार्थत्वं परव्यावृत्त्यपेक्षया ।
तदप्ययुक्तं स्वार्थेपि परार्थत्वप्रसङ्गतः ॥ १४६७ ॥

parārthamanumānaṃ tu na mānaṃ vakrapekṣayā |
anuvādānna tenāsau svayamarthaṃ prapadyate || 1463 ||
śrotṛvyapekṣayā'pyetatsvārthamevopapadyate |
śrotradarśanamūlāyāḥ ko viśeṣo hi saṃvidaḥ || 1464 ||
na parārthānumānatvaṃ vacasaḥ śrotrapekṣayā |
śrotṛsantānavijñānahetutvajñāpakatvataḥ || 1465 ||
yathendriyasya sākṣācca nānumeyaprakāśanam |
tasmādasyāvinābhāvasambandhajñānavanna tat || 1466 ||
athocyate parārthatvaṃ paravyāvṛttyapekṣayā |
tadapyayuktaṃ svārthepi parārthatvaprasaṅgataḥ || 1467 ||

“Inference for the benefit of another cannot be a means of right cognition, because it is only a reiteration so far as the speaker himself is concerned; as the man putting forward the inference does not himself derive his knowledge of the thing from that inference.—For the other person, to whom the inference is addressed, the cognition so derived comes to be for his own sake; because what difference is there between the cognition derived through the ear and that obtained through the eyes?—so far as the other person is concerned, the statement (of the inference) cannot be regarded as inference for the sake of another; because it falls within the chain of cognitions produced by the ear, and because it is a means of cognition,—like the sense-organ,—nor is there any direct indication of the object inferred hence, like the idea of the relation of invariable concomitance, it cannot be a means of right cognition.—If it be explained that—“it is called for the sake of another, because it leads to the activity of the other person”,—that also cannot be right; because (in this way), the inference for one’s own benefit also might be regarded as ‘for the sake of another’ [as that also might lead to the activity of other persons].”—(1463-1467)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Another writer argues as follows:—[see verses 1463-1467 above]

Inference for the sake of others cannot be a means of right cognition, because it is only a reiteration, so far as the speaker himself is concerned.

As regards the other person to whom the Inference is addressed,—for him, the cognition so derived turns out to be for his own benefit; what difference is there between the cognition of a thing derived through the Ear and that-derived through the Eyes? Just as, when one’s Visual Organ is operative, the resultant cognition is not spoken of as being ‘for the benefit of others’,—so also it cannot be spoken of as such if the cognition is derived through the operation of the Auditory Organ.—The term ‘darśana’ stands for the Visual Organ,—the term being derived as ‘dṛśyate anena’, ‘that whereby a thing is seen’.—‘Saṃvit’—stands for cognition.

Similarly, so far as the other person is concerned, to whom the Inference is addressed, the statement of the Inference cannot be said to be for the sake of others;—because it falls within the chain of cognitions produced by the Ear,—or because it is a means of cognition,—like the Sense-organ.—The compound ‘Śrotṛsantānādi’ contains the statement of two reasons; and ‘yatha indṛyasya’ cites the corroborative Instance.

There is another argument also:—So far as the other person is concerned, the statement of the Inference in question cannot be said to be ‘for the sake of another’,—because it does not directly indicate the object inferred,—like the cognition of the relation of Invariable concomitance.—‘Tasmāt’—i.e. because it does not directly indicate the object inferred. What is meant is that because it is not directly indicative of the inferred object, therefore the statement cannot be regarded as a means of Right Cognition,—it being like the Cognition of the relation of Invariable Concomitance,—i.e. the ‘Invariable Concomitance’ between the Probans and the Probandum; and the cognition of an Indicative which is so related to the Probandum (is not by itself the Means of Right Cognition).

If it be explained that “it is said to be for the benefit of another,—because it leads to the activity of the other person”,—even so it cannot be right; because in that sense the Inference for one’s own benefit may also be for the benefit of others; because ‘another’ is a relative term; just like the term ‘other side’,—(1463-1467)

The above arguments are answered in the following—[see verse 1468 next]