by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588
This page contains verse 1457-1459 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1457-1459.
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:
अवस्थादेशकालानां भेदाद्भिन्नासु शक्तिषु ।
भावानामनुमानेन प्रसिद्धिरतिदुर्लभा ॥ १४६० ॥
विज्ञातशक्तेरप्यस्य तां तामर्थक्रियां प्रति ।
विशिष्टद्रव्यसम्बन्धे सा शक्तिः प्रतिबध्यते ॥ १४६१ ॥
यत्नेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः ।
अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैरन्यथैवोपपाद्यते ॥ १४६२ ॥
avasthādeśakālānāṃ bhedādbhinnāsu śaktiṣu |
bhāvānāmanumānena prasiddhiratidurlabhā || 1460 ||
vijñātaśakterapyasya tāṃ tāmarthakriyāṃ prati |
viśiṣṭadravyasambandhe sā śaktiḥ pratibadhyate || 1461 ||
yatnenānumito'pyarthaḥ kuśalairanumātṛbhiḥ |
abhiyuktatarairanyairanyathaivopapādyate || 1462 ||
“Condition, place and time being different in regard to different potencies, the cognition of things by means of inference is not attainable.—Even in the case of a thing whose potency is well-known, that potency becomes restricted in regard to particular effective actions, by becoming related to particular things.—Even when a certain conclusion has been deduced with great care, from an inference,—it may be proved to be otherwise by other more intelligent and clever persons well-versed in the art of reasoning”—(vākyapadīya, p. 16].—(1460-1462)
Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):
Bhartṛhari argues (against Inference) as follows:—[see verses 1460-1462 above]
The potency of things varies with their Condition, Time and Place; hence no definite conclusion can be got at regarding them by means of Inference; for instance, it is not possible to be convinced that ‘Devadatta is unable to bear the burden, because he is Devadatta, like Devadatta in the state of childhood’; here there is a possibility of the man’s potency having changed, hence the reasoning becomes ‘indecisive—Similarly, difference in the place makes a difference in the taste, strength and ripening of the Āmalakī, the Kharjūra and other fruits; hence it cannot be argued that—‘all Āmalakī fruits are astringent, like the Āmalakī I am tasting now.’—Similarly difference of time leads to variations in the coolness and other properties of the water of the well, and hence it cannot be right to argue that ‘all water is cool’, and so on.
‘Avasthādeśākālānām’;—the Genitive ending goes with ‘bhedāt’; and the Genitive in ‘Bhāvānām’ goes with ‘prasiddhi’,
Then again, the Fire’s capacity to burn, which is manifested in the case of grass, is set aside as against the mass of clouds; and there can be no such reasoning as—‘The mass of Clouds is burnt by Fire, because it is earthy (?), like the grass’.
Further, when one man has proved a certain fact, another man, more clever, proves quite the contrary of it; this cannot be desirable.—(1460-1402)