Verse 1457-1459

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

त्रिरूपलिङ्गपूर्वत्वात्स्वार्थं मानं न युज्यते ।
इष्टघातकृता जन्यं मिथ्याज्ञानं यथा किल ॥ १४५७ ॥
भावादननुमानेऽपि न चानुमितिकारणम् ।
द्वैरूप्यमिव लिङ्गस्य त्रैरूप्यं नास्त्यतोऽनुमा ॥ १४५८ ॥
अनुमानविरोधस्य विरुद्धानां च साधने ।
सर्वत्र सम्भवात्किञ्च विरुद्धाव्यभिचारिणः ॥ १४५९ ॥

trirūpaliṅgapūrvatvātsvārthaṃ mānaṃ na yujyate |
iṣṭaghātakṛtā janyaṃ mithyājñānaṃ yathā kila || 1457 ||
bhāvādananumāne'pi na cānumitikāraṇam |
dvairūpyamiva liṅgasya trairūpyaṃ nāstyato'numā || 1458 ||
anumānavirodhasya viruddhānāṃ ca sādhane |
sarvatra sambhavātkiñca viruddhāvyabhicāriṇaḥ || 1459 ||

“Inference for one’s own sake cannot be right,—because it is brought about by the three-featured indicative, which is subversive of what is desirable,—like wrong cognition.—nor can the presence of the ‘three features’ in the indicative be regarded as the means of inference; as they are present also where there is no inference,—just like the ‘two features’.—Further, the contradiction of inference is possible in every reasoning; so also there is possibility in every case of the inferring of mutually contradictory conclusions; and there is possibility of finding a reason which is concomitant (not-separable) with the contrary of the desired conclusion (deduced from an inference).”—(1457-1459)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Cārvākas urge the following arguments (against Inference, as a Means of Right Cognition):—[see verses 1457-1459 above]

Inference for one’s own sake cannot be right,—because it is brought about by the three-featured Indicative,—like the Wrong Cognition. [Here is a Wrong Cognition based upon a three-featured Indicative]—‘The eye and other organs are for the purpose of other persons, because they are composite things; like the Couch, the Seat and such things’; this is a wrong cognition, being subversive of a desirable idea, but brought about by a three-featured Indicative; and like this the Inference in question also is brought about by a three-featured Indicative, and hence it must be wrong.

Nor can the presence of the Three Features in the Indicative be the means of Inference; because, like the Two Features, they are present also where there is no Inference.

Further, in every reasoning, contradiction of Inference would be possible; for example, it would always be possible to put forward the Inference that ‘The intended Probandum cannot reside in the Subject (Minor Term), because it is a part of the aggregate of all these several factors, like the form of the Minor Term itself’;—and this would put an end to all Inferences.

Then again, in all cases, when an Inference has been put forward, there is always a possibility of several undesirable contingencies being put forward; for instance, when the Inference has been put forward that ‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like the Jar’,—some one might set up the argument to the contrary, that ‘just as the reason asserted proves the non-eternality of Bound, so does it also prove the fact of its not being the quality of Ākāśa’, and so forth.

Lastly, in every case, it is possible to find a Reason that is concomitant with the contrary of the desired Conclusion; for instance, the inference having been put forward, that ‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like the Jar’, some one may put forward the following reasoning which is concomitant with (and proves) the contrary of this conclusion—‘Sound is eternal, because it is perceptible by the Ear, like the universal Sound’. Several such examples may be found in the Tattvaṭīkā.—(1457-1459)