Verse 1443-1446

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

प्रत्यक्षदृष्टसम्बन्धं ययोरेव विशेषयोः ।
गोमयेन्धनतद्देशविशेषादिमतिः कृता ॥ १४४३ ॥
तद्देशस्थेन तेनैव गत्वा कालान्तरेऽपि तम् ।
यदाऽग्निं बुध्यते तस्य पूर्वबोधात्पुनः पुनः ॥ १४४४ ॥
सन्दिह्यमानसद्भाववस्तुबोधात्प्रमाणता ।
विशेषदृष्टमेतच्च लिखितं विन्ध्यवासिना ॥ १४४५ ॥
अग्निधूमान्तरत्वे तु वाच्ये सामान्यतोमितौ ।
सामान्यदृष्टमेकान्ताद्गन्तेत्यादित्य उच्यते ॥ १४४६ ॥

pratyakṣadṛṣṭasambandhaṃ yayoreva viśeṣayoḥ |
gomayendhanataddeśaviśeṣādimatiḥ kṛtā || 1443 ||
taddeśasthena tenaiva gatvā kālāntare'pi tam |
yadā'gniṃ budhyate tasya pūrvabodhātpunaḥ punaḥ || 1444 ||
sandihyamānasadbhāvavastubodhātpramāṇatā |
viśeṣadṛṣṭametacca likhitaṃ vindhyavāsinā || 1445 ||
agnidhūmāntaratve tu vācye sāmānyatomitau |
sāmānyadṛṣṭamekāntādgantetyāditya ucyate || 1446 ||

(a) “That based upon the relationship of perceived particulars is as follows:—it so happens that, in the case of two particular things,—such as the fire produced by burning dried cow-dung, and the smoke proceeding from that fire,—the observer has the cognition of the things,—and then subsequently, on going to another place, the observer happens again and again to recognise in other places the presence of the same fire through the indication of the same smoke seen before; and due validity attaches to such cognition (by reason of its being based upon the previous perceptional cognition), and it becomes recognised as a means of cognition distinct from perception; because it brings about the cognition of a thing (fire) the existence of which had been in doubt. It is this that has been described by Vindhyavāsin as inference based upon the perceived relationship of particulars”.—[Ślokavārtika—inference, 141-143].—(1443-1445)

“Though the inference based upon generalised relationship could be exemplified on the basis of another fire and another smoke,—yet the inference cited is that of the ‘sun moving’, as this is based absolutely upon generalised relationship”—[Ślokavārtika.—inference, 145].—(1446)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Question:—Which is the Inference based upon the Perceived Particulars?

Answer:—[Given by Kumārila]:—[see verses 1443-1445 above]

What is meant is as follows:—First of all, the man has noticed through Sense-perception in a certain place a particular Fire and a particular Smoke,—at a later time, he goes to another place and again and again sees the same particular Smoke, and then infers the same particular Fire;—this is Inference based upon the perception (of the relationship) of Particulars; it is so called because it has for its objective the previously-perceived Particular. This cannot be regarded as invalid on the ground of apprehending what has been already apprehended; because there is an additional factor present here, in the shape of the removal of the doubt as to whether or not the Fire is still there.—This is the sum total of what Kumarila means.

We now proceed to explain the words in detail—

‘That based upon the relationship of perceived Particulars’.—Question—‘What relationship’?—The answer is as follows;—Śabarasvāmin has stated the definition of Inference as follows:—‘When the perception of one factor of a well-recognised relationship leads to the cognition of the other factor of that relationship,—which latter is not in contact with the man’s sense-organs—this second cognition is what is called Inference (Inferential Cognition). This Inferential Cognition is of two kinds: (1) that based upon directly perceived relationship, and (2) that based upon a generalised relationship. As an example of the former, we have the inferential cognition of Fire following from the cognition of Smoke [which is based upon the relation of invariable concomitance between a particular Smoke and a particular Fire perceived in the kitchen); and as an example of the second kind of Inference, we have the case where, finding that the Sun changes its position, we infer that it moves,—on the ground of our experience that in the ease of Devadatta it is only by moving that he changes his position (which experience has led to the generalised relationship between moving and change of position in general).’ (Śabara-Bhāṣya, on 1. 1. 5, Translation, page 15).

In connection with tins, Kumārila, with a view to explaining the nature of the Inference based upon the perceived relationship of Particulars has used the words—‘Pratyakṣadṛṣṭasambandham, etc.’. (Text 1443.)—This is to be construed as ‘The Inference based upon the relationship of perceived Particulars—they explain as follows’;—The words ‘they explain’ having gone before in the preceding text (in the Ślokavārtika).

In connection with the two particular things—Fire and Smoke—the observer has formed the idea of the new factor in the shape of dry cowdung,—the idea being that ‘these two things Fire and Smoke are the effect of the burning of dry cowdung’;—and then he has also formed the idea of the particular spot in the shape of the Hill,—the idea being that ‘these two things, Fire and Smoke, exist on the Hill’.—The compound ‘gomayendhana’ means ‘that of which dry cowdung is the fuel’, and the compound ‘taddeśa’ means ‘that of which that is the place’;—and these two compounds qualify the ‘viśeṣa’ the ‘two particular things’ (Fire and Smoke);—the ‘ādi’ stands for other particular fuels in the shape of the woods of the various trees, Sarja, Sarala, Sallakī and the rest,—and also other Fires;—there arises the cognition, in regard to these;—the Locative being construed by ‘splitting up’ the words;—such perceptional cognition becomes apprehended by the observer;—that same observer, through the indicative in the shape of the same Smoke as seen in another place and at another time, cognises the same Fire; and this happens again and again;—this cognition thus becomes one that is distinct from the previous Perceptional Cognition.—Or the construction may be ‘he cognises Fire on the basis of the previous cognition’.—The compound ‘Sandihyamāna, etc.’ is to be interpreted as ‘the cognition of that thing whose presence was in doubt—as to whether it is there or not—This Inference based upon the relationship of perceived Particulars, as described above, has been spoken of by Vindhyavāsin as ‘Viśeṣatodṛṣṭa’, ‘Inference in relation to Particulars’.—(1443-1445)

The other kind of Inference, the Sāmānyatodṛṣta, that based upon generalised Relationship, is next described—[see verse 1446 above]

The author of the Bhāṣya (Śabara) has cited the Inference of the moving of the Sun from its change of position as an example of Inference based upon generalised Relationship. In regard to this, the following objection might be raised—‘In reference to another Fire and another Smoke (other than those actually perceived), there can be Inference on the basis of common character; and this Inference of Fire and Smoke would be based upon generalised Relationship; while these Smoke and Fire were present in his mind already, why did he give this up and cite the case of the Sun moving as an example of Inference based upon generalised Relationship?’

Anticipating this, Kumārila offers the explanation—‘Though the Inference, etc. etc.’, That is to say, when the Inference based upon Generalised Relationship could be cited, on the basis of other Smoke and Fire as corroborative Instances,—the author of the Bhāṣya has cited the case of the Sun, in consideration of the fact that the moving of the Sun is imperceptible at all times, and hence for cognising it, the only means available is the Inference based upon generalised Relationship, and not that based upon Perceived Particulars; hence he wished to cite a case like that of the Sun which was purely and unalloyedly one of Inference based on Generalised Relationship; and he did not cite the case of Smoke and Fire, as in this case the Inference need not always be one based upon Generalised Relationship.—(1446)

The objection to the above-mentioned classification of Inference is as follows:—[see verses 1448 next]