Verse 1408-1415

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

यस्मिन्प्रागुपलब्धश्च नोपलब्धश्च यत्र सः ।
अन्वयो व्यतिरेको वा विस्पष्टं तत्र दृश्यते ॥ १४०८ ॥
शब्दस्तु ज्ञापयत्यर्थं नैव बाह्यं कथंचन ।
अन्यथासम्भवाभावाद्विलक्षागमकस्त्वसौ ॥ १४०९ ॥
तस्यां च प्रतिपाद्यायां वैलक्षण्यमतिस्फुटम् ।
विवक्षासंमुखीभावे न हि शब्दः प्रयुज्यते ॥ १४१० ॥
दीपस्तु ज्ञापको नैव नीलादेर्लिङ्गभावतः ।
ज्ञानोत्पादनयोग्यस्य जननात्तु तथोच्यते ॥ १४११ ॥
ज्ञापके लिङ्गरूपे च पक्षधर्मादि चिन्त्यते ।
अन्यथा चक्षुरादीनां कस्मादेतन्न चोद्यते ॥ १४१२ ॥
अन्यथानुपपत्त्याऽपि चाक्षुषत्वं न साधकम् ।
पक्षधर्मवियोगेन क्लीबास्तेनैकलक्षणाः ॥ १४१३ ॥
एकरूपतयोक्तानां द्वैरूप्यं चोपलक्षितम् ।
द्विरूपत्वेन चोक्तानां त्रैरूप्यं पक्षधर्मतः ॥ १४१४ ॥
अन्यथाऽनुपपत्त्यैव चाक्षेपादिति चेन्न तत् ।
शब्दादावन्यथापीष्टे चाक्षुषत्वेऽथ नास्त्यसौ ॥ १४१५ ॥

yasminprāgupalabdhaśca nopalabdhaśca yatra saḥ |
anvayo vyatireko vā vispaṣṭaṃ tatra dṛśyate || 1408 ||
śabdastu jñāpayatyarthaṃ naiva bāhyaṃ kathaṃcana |
anyathāsambhavābhāvādvilakṣāgamakastvasau || 1409 ||
tasyāṃ ca pratipādyāyāṃ vailakṣaṇyamatisphuṭam |
vivakṣāsaṃmukhībhāve na hi śabdaḥ prayujyate || 1410 ||
dīpastu jñāpako naiva nīlāderliṅgabhāvataḥ |
jñānotpādanayogyasya jananāttu tathocyate || 1411 ||
jñāpake liṅgarūpe ca pakṣadharmādi cintyate |
anyathā cakṣurādīnāṃ kasmādetanna codyate || 1412 ||
anyathānupapattyā'pi cākṣuṣatvaṃ na sādhakam |
pakṣadharmaviyogena klībāstenaikalakṣaṇāḥ || 1413 ||
ekarūpatayoktānāṃ dvairūpyaṃ copalakṣitam |
dvirūpatvena coktānāṃ trairūpyaṃ pakṣadharmataḥ || 1414 ||
anyathā'nupapattyaiva cākṣepāditi cenna tat |
śabdādāvanyathāpīṣṭe cākṣuṣatve'tha nāstyasau || 1415 ||

In that house wherein the father had been found before,—and also in that wherein he had not been found before,—there is the concomitance, positive and negative, clearly perceived,—as regards the word, it does not make known any external object at all; because in this case, the character of ‘being otherwise impossible’ is not present; the word can only be the indicator of the ‘speaker’s wish’ (to speak of a certain thing). If this (speaker’s wish) were meant to be what is expressed by the word, then its difference is quite clear. Because when the ‘speaker’s wish’ is not there, the word cannot be used.—As regards the lamp, it does not make the blue and other things known by becoming the indicative (inferential); all that it does is to make things capable of being cognised; and it is only in this sense that it is called a ‘means of cognition only in case the word were an inferential indicative, would it be necessary to consider if it fulfils the conditions of being present in the subject (minor term.) and so forth. Otherwise, why cannot the same be urged in connection with the eye and other organs (as means of cognition)?—Even through the character of ‘being otherwise impossible’, visibility cannot prove anything, unless it is present in the subject (minor term).—Thus ‘one-featured’ probans are all impotent.—In those that have been cited as ‘one-featured’ probans, the presence of two features becomes clearly indicated; and in those that have been cited as ‘two-featured’, the presence of three features becomes clearly indicated; because every probans must reside in the subject (which therefore is an additional condition that must be fulfilled).—If it be argued that “this feature is implied by the character of being otherwise impossible”,—that cannot be so; because in the case of sound, though visibility may be otherwise desired, it is not present in sound (which is the subject).—(1408-1415)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

In the case of Words, the character of being otherwise impossible cannot be admissible,—in reference to external things; because it cannot serve as an Inferential Indicative of these latter,—being, as it is, dependent entirely upon the Speaker’s wish.—If the said character is asserted in the case of words, in reference to the object that figures in the cognition (brought about by the words),—then, there are all the three features present, as in the case of Smoke (indicating the Fire). Because, if the Speaker’s wish is not there, words cannot be used, the use must be regarded as the effect of that wish; and as such it is indicative of the thing spoken of, just as the Smoke is of Fire; and this is accepted by us; but not as being expressive of the thing.

As regards the Lamp, it is not admitted to be even the Indicator like Smoke; all that is admitted is that it has come to be popularly regarded as the Indicator (making things known) by reason of its making the Jar, etc. (objects cognised) capable of bringing about the cognition; but the words are not inferential Indicatives; hence any discussion as to the Indicative subsisting in the Subject cannot arise in this case. If it did arise in this case, then why could not the same discussion arise in the case of the Eye and the rest (which are the means of Sense-perception, not Inferential Indicatives)?

‘Otherwise, etc. etc.’;—this sums up the subject-matter under consideration. The sense is that, even though Visibility is invariably concomitant with non-eternality, it does not prove this non-eternality in Sound.

Thus then, inasmuch as in all cases, the condition of subsisting in the Subject must be present,—by admitting this as a necessary condition, those Probans that have been cited as ‘one-featured’, must, necessarily, become ‘two-featured’,—and those cited as ‘two-featured’ must become ‘three-featured Thus, on account of the necessity of subsistence in the Subject, it is the one-featured Probans that are really impotent.

It cannot be right to argue that—“such characters as subsisting in the Subject are all implied by that of ‘being otherwise impossible’, and hence they cannot form so many different independent characteristics of the Probans”—because the other party has himself asserted that there is the character of ‘being otherwise impossible’, even when subsistence in the Subject is not there, in the following passage—“Through the character of being otherwise impossible the Lamp and other things are actually indicative of things, even though they do not reside in the subject (Text 1378, above)”.

In the case of Visibility,—even though ‘non-eternality’ is ‘otherwise impossible’,—visibility does not subsist in the Subject. So that in every way what has been asserted is entirely doubtful.—(1408-1415)