The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1402 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1402.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

स्वहेतुनियतोद्भूतिरङ्कुरादिश्च विद्यते ।
तस्मिन्दृष्टान्त एवं च वैलक्षण्यमतिस्फुटम् ॥ १४०२ ॥

svahetuniyatodbhūtiraṅkurādiśca vidyate |
tasmindṛṣṭānta evaṃ ca vailakṣaṇyamatisphuṭam || 1402 ||

The sprout is actually found to exist as having its birth inseparably connected with its cause; and this is always available as the corroborative instance; the instance per dissimilarity is too clear (to be stated).—(1402)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged It may be that, in the manner shown, the Perception may be the Subject; even so, the Probans remains only ‘two-featured’”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 1402 above]

Inseparably connected with its Cause’—invariably concomitant with its Cause—is the birth—appearance, coming into existence—of the Sprout. Things like the Sprout, having their birth dependent upon their Cause and hence coming into existence only occasionally, are possible as the Corroborative Instance (in the proving of the Visual Perception as being due to the Eye);—the argument being formulated thus:—Those things that appear on the presence of something else, only occasionally, cannot be regarded as produced from that alone, they must be regarded as dependent upon other causes,—for instance, even when the soil and other things are there, the Sprout is found to appear or not to appear according as the seed is there or not there;—even when Colour, etc. are there, the Visual Perception appears only at certain times, according as the Eyes are closed or not closed; hence in the case of the denial of the Eye, the argument would point out that the said denial would be contrary to a wider proposition; while in the case of the asserting of the existence of the Eye, it would contain a natural reason.—(1402)

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