Verse 1365

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अन्यथाऽनुपपन्नत्वं यस्यासौ हेतुरिष्यते ।
एकलक्षणकः सोऽर्थश्चतुर्लक्षणको न वा ॥ १३६५ ॥

anyathā'nupapannatvaṃ yasyāsau heturiṣyate |
ekalakṣaṇakaḥ so'rthaścaturlakṣaṇako na vā || 1365 ||

“That which is ‘otherwise impossible’ is held to be the probans, while this is only ‘one-featured’; it may or may not be regarded as ‘four-featured’.”—(1365)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

In the following Texts, Pātrasvāmin justifies the view that the true Probans is that which has the one characteristic of being ‘otherwise impossible’,—by showing in detail that there is positive as well as negative concomitance (between the definition and the thing defined):—[see verses 1365 above]

‘One-featured’—That which has only one characteristic, that of being ‘otherwise impossible’; that alone—none other,—is regarded as ‘Probans’, by ordinary men as well as by investigators. Through Presumption this same character implies the three features of ‘Being present in the Subject’ and so forth; and hence it may be regarded as ‘four-featured’;—or it may not be so regarded, because in several cases, the Probans is found to be valid even when it has only one or two or three features.

Inasmuch as ‘being otherwise impossible’ is its one characteristic feature,—it is called ‘one-featured’.—Along with ‘being otherwise impossible’, if it is found to exist in like things and not to exist in unlike things, then, it becomes ‘two-featured’; and when along with ‘being otherwise impossible’, it is also existent in like things and also to be absent where the Probandum is known to be absent, then it is ‘three-featured’; and it is not called ‘three-featured’ on account of the presence of the three features of ‘presence in the Subject’ and the rest (mentioned in the Buddhist’s definition); because a Probans of this latter kind cannot bring about a valid cognition.—(1365)

“Or, the Probans is spoken of as ‘one-featured’ in view of the one character of ‘being otherwise impossible’, because this is its principal characteristic; and it is not spoken of in terms of the other features of ‘presence in the Subject’ and the rest, because these latter are secondary, or because they do not serve any useful purpose.”—This is what is shown in the following—[see verse 1366 next]