Verse 1362-1363

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

स्वपरार्थविभागेन त्वनुमानं द्विधेष्यते ।
स्वार्थं त्रिरूपतो लिङ्गादनुमेयार्थदर्शनम् ॥ १३६२ ॥
त्रिरूपलिङ्गवचनं परार्थं पुनरुच्यते ।
एकैकद्विद्विरूपोऽर्थो लिङ्गाभासस्ततो मतः ॥ १३६३ ॥

svaparārthavibhāgena tvanumānaṃ dvidheṣyate |
svārthaṃ trirūpato liṅgādanumeyārthadarśanam || 1362 ||
trirūpaliṅgavacanaṃ parārthaṃ punarucyate |
ekaikadvidvirūpo'rtho liṅgābhāsastato mataḥ || 1363 ||

Inference is held to be of two kinds, as divided into—(1) for one’s own benefit, and (2) for the benefit of others. (1) inference ‘for one’s own benefit’ consists in the cognition of the inferred object derived from the three-featured probans; and (2) inference ‘for the benefit of others’ consists in the statement of the three-featured probans. That probans which has only one or two features (out of the necessary three) is regarded as a ‘semblance of the probans’.—(1362-1363)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Author proceeds to state the definition of Inference:—[see verses 1362-1363 above]

Inference is of two kinds—as divided into ‘for one’s own benefit’ and ‘for the benefit of others’,—The former should be understood to be that Cognition of the inferred object which is derived from ‘the three-featured Probans’,—the Indicative that fulfils the three conditions of (1) ‘being present in the Subject’, (2) ‘being present in that wherein the Probandum is known to be present’, and (3) ‘being entirely absent where the Probandum is known to be absent’.—The Inference ‘for the sake of others’ should be understood to consist in the verbal expression of the said three-featured Probans.

Question:—“Why has not the definition of the Wrong Inference been provided?”

Answer:—‘That Probans which, etc. etc.’—‘Sound is eternal, (a) because it is a product, and (b) because it is corporeal, and (c) because it is non-cognisable’,—in this Inference only one of the ‘three features’ is present in each; e.g. in (a) the character of being a Product fulfils the single condition, of being present in the subject (Sound) [while it does not fulfil the condition of being present where the Probandum is known to be present, as the Probandum, Eternality, is known to be present in Ākāśa, Soul, etc., which are not Products; nor does it fulfil the condition of being absent where the Probandum is absent, as the Probandum, Eternality, is absent in the Jar, where the character of being a Product is not absent];—(b) the character of being corporeal, fulfils only the second condition, of being present where the Probandum is known to be present and does not fulfil the first condition of being present in the Subject (Sound), because Sound is not corporeal; nor does it fulfil the third condition of being absent where the Probandum is absent, as it is not absent in the Jar (which is corporeal) where the Probandum (Eternality) is known to be absent;—and (c) the character of being non-cognisable fulfils only the third condition, of being absent where the Proban-dura (Eternality) is known to be absent (e.g. in the Soul, etc. which are cognisable) [and it does not fulfil the other two conditions, as it is not present in the Subject, Sound, which is cognisable; nor is it present where the Probandum is known to be present, e.g. the Soul, etc, which are cognisable],—Those fulfilling only two of the thrée conditions are the Probans in the following argument—‘Sound is non-eternal,—(a) because it is visible, (b) because it is audible, and (c) becaxise it is incorporeal’;—where respectively only the following conditions are not fulfilled—(a) ‘Because it is visible’ does not fulfil only the condition of being present in the subject; (b) ‘Because it is audible’ does not fulfil the only condition of being present where the Probandum is known to be present; and (c) ‘Because it is incorporeal’ does not fulfil the only condition of being absent where the Probandum is known to be absent.—This has been thus expressed.—‘Sound is eternal, because it is a product, because it is corporeal and because it is non-cognisable;—and Sound is non-eternal, because it is incorporeal, because it is audible and because it is visible’.—(1362-1363)