Verse 1332-1339

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

नैरन्तर्यप्रवृत्ते हि बाह्यवस्तूपलम्भते ।
सुखादि वेद्यते कस्मात्तस्मिन्काले निरन्तरम् ॥ १३३२ ॥
मानसेनैव यद्वेद्यमिष्यते चेतसा न च ।
तत्काले तस्य सद्भावः क्रमजन्मोपवर्णनात ॥ १३३३ ॥
जन्मैव यौगपद्येन नेष्यते न पुनः स्थितिः ।
इति चेन्न स्थितिस्तस्य क्षणभङ्गप्रसाधनात् ॥ १३३४ ॥
आशुवृत्तेः सकृद्भ्रान्तिरिति चेत्साऽप्यपाकृता ।
विस्पष्टप्रतिभासो हि न स्यात्स्मरणगोचरे ॥ १३३५ ॥
सातासाताशाताशातादिरूपा च सा भ्रान्तिर्यदि कल्प्यते ।
तदा प्राप्ता सुखादीनां सत्ता तन्मात्रलक्षणा ॥ १३३६ ॥
यदा च योगिनोऽन्येषामध्यक्षेण सुखादिकम् ।
विदन्ति तुल्यानुभवात्तद्वत्तेऽपि स्युरातुराः ॥ १३३७ ॥
स्वस्मिन्नपि हि दुःखस्य सत्तैवानुभवो न ते ।
किं तु तद्विषयं ज्ञानं तच्चास्ति परसन्ततौ ॥ १३३८ ॥
परदुःखानुमाने च तुल्यमेतत्तथाहि तत् ।
(अनुमानं स)विषयं वर्ण्यते न त्वगोचरम् ॥ १३३९ ॥

nairantaryapravṛtte hi bāhyavastūpalambhate |
sukhādi vedyate kasmāttasminkāle nirantaram || 1332 ||
mānasenaiva yadvedyamiṣyate cetasā na ca |
tatkāle tasya sadbhāvaḥ kramajanmopavarṇanāta || 1333 ||
janmaiva yaugapadyena neṣyate na punaḥ sthitiḥ |
iti cenna sthitistasya kṣaṇabhaṅgaprasādhanāt || 1334 ||
āśuvṛtteḥ sakṛdbhrāntiriti cetsā'pyapākṛtā |
vispaṣṭapratibhāso hi na syātsmaraṇagocare || 1335 ||
sātāsātāśātāśātādirūpā ca sā bhrāntiryadi kalpyate |
tadā prāptā sukhādīnāṃ sattā tanmātralakṣaṇā || 1336 ||
yadā ca yogino'nyeṣāmadhyakṣeṇa sukhādikam |
vidanti tulyānubhavāttadvatte'pi syurāturāḥ || 1337 ||
svasminnapi hi duḥkhasya sattaivānubhavo na te |
kiṃ tu tadviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ taccāsti parasantatau || 1338 ||
paraduḥkhānumāne ca tulyametattathāhi tat |
(anumānaṃ sa)viṣayaṃ varṇyate na tvagocaram || 1339 ||

As a matter of fact, pleasure, etc. are felt immediately after the perception of the external object; why is it that they are always felt at that same time?—It is regarded as cognised by mental perception; but this perception is not there at the time; as cognitions have been described as appearing in succession (not at the same time).—If it be urged that “it is only simultaneous birth of cognitions that is not admitted, not their simultaneous existence”,—then the answer is that there can be no (continued) existence of anything; as all things have been proved to be momentary.—If it be urged that “there is an illusion of simultaneity, due to the quick succession of the cognitions”,—this also has been rejected already.—If the pleasure, etc., were amenable only to remembrance, then the feeling could not be vivid (as it is).—If it be assumed that the said illusion is in the form of ‘agreeable’ and ‘disagreeable’,—then it comes to this that the existence of pleasure and pain rests in themselves (and they are thus self-cognised).—When the mystics cognise, by sense-perception, the pleasure, etc. of other persons,—then, on account of the similarity of experience, they would themselves be unhappy (at the unhappiness of other people). For you, the feeling of pain consists, not in the existence of the pain itself, but in the cognition of which that pain is the object; and that is another ‘chain’.—The same applies to the inference of another person’s pain also, as inference has been described (by others) as objective (with object), and not purely subjective (not touching objects).—(1332-1339)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It is meant to show that the Proposition (of the Vaiśeṣika) is contrary to perceived facts.

When, as a matter of fact, Pleasure, etc., are apprehended at the same time as the Cognition of the external object upon which they rest,—then by which particular cognition subsisting in the same substratum as themselves would they be apprehended?—Certainly not by that Visual Cognition of the external object; as this rests upon the external object, while Pleasure, etc. are felt within and as such they are held to be cognisable by mental Cognition only. And yet at the time concerned there can be no mental Cognition; because the theory held is that Cognitions appear in succession, one after the other.

It might be held that—“it is only the birth of Cognitions that has been held to be in succession, not their existence”.

That cannot be right; as it has been established that all that is born has only a momentary existence.

As regards the explanation that “there is only an illusion of simultaneity, due to the quickness of the succession”,—this has been already refuted.

Then again, under the view suggested, the clear perception of Pleasure and Pain, in the form of joy and grief, would not be possible; because the view held is that Pleasure and Pain, envisaging Conceptual Contents, are apprehended only by Mental Perception; and Mental Perception is Conceptual; and what is conceptual cannot make the appearance of things quite clear. Under our view on the other hand, what is regarded as Sense-perception is that which is brought about by the Cognition brought about by the Sense-organs, which is,aided by the object coming into existence immediately after the object of the said Sense-perception.

Further, if Pleasure and Pain were actually apprehensible, their manifestation would be as something separate, as in the case of the Blue and other things; and yet if they were separated from the cognition, they could not be felt as agreeable and disagreeable.

It might be argued that—“as there is no difference from the Cognition, the idea of agreeableness and disagreeableness must be wrong”.

In that case it becomes established that the existence of Pleasure and Pain rests in their own cognition; because Pleasure and Pain have no other form apart from what is agreeable and disagreeable; and if it is admitted that the Cognition has this form, then it also becomes admitted that Pleasure and Pain also are of the nature of Cognition itself. Any other form not being admitted, it cannot be admitted that they are mere illusions.

‘Agreeable’ is that which is favourable, and the opposite of this is ‘disagreeable’,

The term ‘and the rest’ (after ‘Pleasure’) includes Indifference.

If then the existence of Pleasure, etc., consists only in the appearance of their own ‘Chain’,—and it is not accepted that the same constitutes their apprehension also,—but it is held that their apprehension must consist in the appearance of the cognition regarding themselves,—then, in that case? when Mystics apprehend the Pleasure, etc., of other persons, they should be just as unhappy as the persons actually experiencing the Pain, etc., and it is not open to you to say that “it cannot be so, as they belong to separate chains”; because you do not admit that their continuance consists in the fact of their appearance in the same ‘chain’; what you accept is only the appearance of the Cognition of the Pain; and the cognition is present in the ‘chain’ of other people also; so that the incongruity remains.

If, as the cause of Pleasure, etc. you accept both,—then, inasmuch as the Pleasure, etc. would be present in their own ‘chains’, it becomes proved that they are self-cognised. In this way, ‘presence in one’s own chain’ serves to distinguish them from those ‘present in other chains’.

Question:—“If Pleasure, etc. are of the nature of their own cognition, then, how can the said incongruity of mystic perception be urged against those—Mīmāṃsakas for instance,—who do not admit of any mystics?”

Answer:—‘The same applies, etc. etc.’—Except Buddhists, there are no philosophers for whom Inference is, in reality, devoid of objectivity; hence, for one who infers the Pain of other persons (just as the Mystic who perceives it), there would be the same experiencing of pain—[so that the said incongruity would be there all the same].—(1332-1339)