Verse 1298

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

एकान्तेनान्यताभावाज्जात्याद्याद्येन चेद्गतम् ।
विज्ञातार्थाधिगन्तृत्वात्स्मार्त्तज्ञानसमं परम् ॥ १२९८ ॥

ekāntenānyatābhāvājjātyādyādyena cedgatam |
vijñātārthādhigantṛtvātsmārttajñānasamaṃ param || 1298 ||

On account of there being no absolute distinction (between the universal and the specific individuality),—if the universal and other properties have become already apprehended by the initial cognition,—then the subsequent cognition would be apprehending only what has been already apprehended,—and it would thus be like remembrance.—(1298)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been proved that if the subsequent Cognitions apprehend the Specific Individuality, they must be ‘Non-conceptual’.—The Author now proceeds to show that—even granting that the said cognitions are ‘Conceptual’, as they would be apprehending only what has been already apprehended (by the previous Non-conceptual Cognition), no validity could attach to those Cognitions:—[see verse 1298 above]

The Universal and the rest are not regarded as absolutely distinct from the Individual; as has been declared by Kumārila (in Ślokavārtika, Sense-perception, 141) that—“The Universal and the rest are not anything other than the Individual Under the circumstances, as the Universal and the rest will have been already apprehended by the initial (non-conceptual) Pre-cognition, the subsequent definite (conceptual) cognition of the same Universal and the rest would be apprehending only what has been already apprehended,—and thus being like Remembrance,—it must have to be regarded as invalid.

This argument may be formulated as follows:—The Cognition apprehending what has been already apprehended cannot be valid,—e.g. Remembrance;—the Conceptual Cognition following on the wake of Perception apprehends what has been already apprehended;—hence there is perception of a character contrary to the wider notion (of validity).—(1298)