Tattvasangraha [with commentary]
by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588
This page contains verse 1282-1283 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1282-1283.
Verse 1282-1283
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:
निरुपाख्याच्च सामान्यं विशेषं संप्रतीयते ।
अतो विकल्पकज्ञानग्राह्यं तदपि ते भवेत् ॥ १२८२ ॥
नासतस्तद्विशिष्टं चेत्किभिदानीं तदात्मकम् ।
नो चेत्तथापि वैशिष्ट्यं तस्मादस्य न किं मतम् ॥ १२८३ ॥nirupākhyācca sāmānyaṃ viśeṣaṃ saṃpratīyate |
ato vikalpakajñānagrāhyaṃ tadapi te bhavet || 1282 ||
nāsatastadviśiṣṭaṃ cetkibhidānīṃ tadātmakam |
no cettathāpi vaiśiṣṭyaṃ tasmādasya na kiṃ matam || 1283 ||The universal is cognised as ‘distinguished’ (distinct) from the featureless thing; hence for you, it should be cognisable by conceptual perception.—If it be urged that “the universal cannot be regarded as distinguished from a non-entity”,—then (we ask) is it of the same nature as the non-entity? if not, then why is it not admitted that it is ‘distinguished’ from it?—(1282-1283)
Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):
Further, it may be that the Universal being non-different from the Particulars, it may not be ‘distinguished’ from those; even so, the Universal would certainly be ‘distinguished’ from such featureless non-entities as the ‘Hare’s Horn’; and it would thus become apprehensible by Conceptual Perception; and yet it is not so; hence your reason remains ‘Inconclusive This is what is pointed out in the following—[see verses 1282-1283 above]
The following might be urged There can be no distinction made between the Universal and the Non-entity; nor can there be any similarity between them. Because that is supposed to be a nonentity which is not anything; and such a thing cannot be either ‘distinguished’ from, or similar to, the Universal. If it were, it would be an Entity.—Even if the Void—i.e. the Non-entity—were ‘distinguished’ from the Universal, then also it would be an entity; because a non-entity cannot have the character of ‘being distinguished’; and without the character of ‘being distinguished’ a thing cannot be regarded as ‘distinguished—Nor can the Non-entity be ‘similar’ to the Universal; as even so it would have to be an entity. A non-entity cannot have a form similar to something else; and unless a thing has a form similar to another’s, it cannot be regarded as ‘similar’ to it; as otherwise it would lead to an absurdity.—Hence relatively to the Void (Non-entity), the Universal cannot be said to be either distinguished (distinct) or similar. Because when one thing is either distinct or similar in relation to another thing, then this latter also has to be regarded as distinct from, or similar to, the former. If it were not so, then the others also could not be perceived as distinct from, or similar to, it.—Further, there is no such thing as ‘non-entity’ apart from entity; when an entity is not found to be another entity, it is called ‘nonentity’ in relation to it; how then could it be ‘distinguished’?”
All this has been argued by Sumati; as against all this, the Author proceeds to urge as follows:—[see verses 1284-1285 next]