Verse 1278-1279

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

वैषम्यसमभावोऽयं प्रविभक्तो यदीष्यते ।
सामान्यस्य विशिष्टत्वं तदवस्थं विशेषतः ॥ १२७८ ॥
अथाविभक्त एवायमसङ्कीर्णा स्थितिः कथम् ।
अन्योन्यापरिहारेण स्थितेर्गत्यन्तरं नच ॥ १२७९ ॥

vaiṣamyasamabhāvo'yaṃ pravibhakto yadīṣyate |
sāmānyasya viśiṣṭatvaṃ tadavasthaṃ viśeṣataḥ || 1278 ||
athāvibhakta evāyamasaṅkīrṇā sthitiḥ katham |
anyonyāparihāreṇa sthitergatyantaraṃ naca || 1279 ||

If the said ‘similarity’ and ‘dissimilarity’ are held to be differentiated, then the fact of the universal being distinguished from the particulars remains as before.—If, on the other hand, they are not held to be differentiated, then, how can the clearly marked division be possible, without crossing each other? there is no other way in which they could be conceived.—(1278-1279)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

‘Differentiated’:—Not mixed up; i.e. the Universal being one thing and the Particular being another thing.

That the Universal is distinguished from the Particular is said only by way of illustration; in fact the Particular also is distinguished from the Universal; as both these having distinct characters are clearly distinguished from one another.

‘The fact, etc.’—‘Asaṅkīrṇā’ is unmixed. This has been declared by the same Sumati in the following words—“The Particular is perceived only as infused with the character of such Universals as ‘Being’ and the like, not otherwise; hence it is only right that what is qualified should form the object of a qualified (determinate, conceptual) Perception; as for the Universal, on the other hand, it is capable of being perceived independently of all Particulars; and hence there can be nothing incongruous in its forming the object of the non-conceptual Perception”.—This clearly marked distinction would not be there.

It might be argued that—“It is not held to be either distinguished or undistinguished.”

The answer to that is—‘How can, etc. etc.’—As a matter of fact, among things so related that the presence or absence of one must imply the absence or presence of another,—the negation of one is inseparable from the affirmation of another; consequently, there can be no other alternative.—(1278-1279)

Then again, to speak of the Particulars as apprehended ‘without distinction’ involves a contradiction in terms.—This is what is shown in the following—[see verses 1280-1281 next]