Verse 1265-1267

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

ननु नामादिकं माभूत्तस्य ग्राह्यं विशेषणम् ।
तथाऽप्यसिद्धता हेतोर्नैव व्यावर्त्तेते यतः ॥ १२६५ ॥
अर्थान्तरव्यवच्छिन्नरूपेणाग्रहणं यदि ।
अर्थमात्रग्रहो वा स्यादग्रहो वा घटे यथा ॥ १२६६ ॥
घटान्तरव्यवच्छिन्नरूपेणाग्रहणं यदि ।
घटमात्रग्रहो वा स्यादग्रहो वा घटस्य वै ॥ १२६७ ॥

nanu nāmādikaṃ mābhūttasya grāhyaṃ viśeṣaṇam |
tathā'pyasiddhatā hetornaiva vyāvarttete yataḥ || 1265 ||
arthāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇaṃ yadi |
arthamātragraho vā syādagraho vā ghaṭe yathā || 1266 ||
ghaṭāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇaṃ yadi |
ghaṭamātragraho vā syādagraho vā ghaṭasya vai || 1267 ||

“Name (universal) and the rest may not be the distinguishing properties perceived, in the object (op sense-perception);—even so, the reason put forward does not cease to be inadmissible; because if there is no apprehension of the thing as distinguished from other things, then, there would either be an apprehension of the thing by itself only, or no apprehension at all; as in the case of the jar,—if there is no apprehension of the jar as distinguished from other jars, then there is either apprehension of the jar by itself alone, or no apprehension of the jar at all.”—(1265-1267)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

In the following texts, the Author sets forth the ‘inadmissible character’ of the Reason put forward by himself (under Texts 1257-1260),—this criticism being urged from the standpoint of the Digambara (Jaina) philosopher, Sumati:—[see verses 1265-1267 above]

Sumati describes all things as existing in two forms—the Universal and the Particular; the Universal again is of two kinds—one determined by the Particular, e.g. the ‘Cow’, and that not so determined (conceptual), e.g.

‘Being’, ‘Entity’, That Universal which exists only in the undetermined (non-conceptual) form is of only one form and is amenable to non-conceptual Perception (Perception free from Conceptual Content), in the form of mere observation, purely subjective Ideation; while the other—i.e. the Universal determined by particulars—is amenable to Conceptual Perception.—Such is Sumati’s scheme of Perception.

Kumārila however describes the Non-Conceptual Perception, purely subjective Ideation, as apprehending the ‘Specific Individuality’ of the particular (or Individual); and the Conceptual Perception as apprehending the ‘Universal

Sumati, in examining the nature of Perception in the form of purely subjective Ideation as posited by Kumārila and others, has argued thus—“One who holds this view should be asked the following question.—In this Perception, is the Thing before the eyes of the observer apprehended purely by itself, as characterised by its own form which is impossible anywhere else? Or is it not so apprehended?—If he says it is not so perceived, then our answer to him is as follows:—If there is non-apprehension of the Thing in a form distinguished from other things;—that is, in a form distinguished from a thing other than the intended thing,—i.e. the form or character of the intended thing which is not present in the other thing;—if there is nonapprehension of the Thing as qualified by such a form,—then, either there would be apprehension of the Thing itself only,—i.e. the said Thing even without the character impossible in other things;—or, if even this is not apprehended, then there would be no perception of the Thing at all.—‘As in the case of the Jar’;—this cites an example.

This example is explained in the next text (1267):—“In the case of the perception of the Jar, if there is no apprehension of the Jar in the form that is impossible in another Jar, to which it may be compared,—then either there would be apprehension of the Jar by itself alone,—without any qualification as that of being of silver or of copper and so forth;—or, if there is no apprehension of the Jar by itself, then there would be no apprehension of any Jar at all,—not even of the one intended; so that there would be no apprehension of the Jar at all.—In the same manner, in the case in question if the distinguishing character is not apprehended, there would either he apprehension of the thing alone by itself,—or there would be no apprehension at all; there could be no escape from these alternatives—(1265-1267)

[Sumati’s] Pūrvapakṣa (Criticism) against us thus would be as follows:—[see verse 1268 next]