The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1264 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1264.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अशक्यसमयो ह्यात्मा नीलादीनामनन्यभाक् ।
तेषामतश्च संवित्तिर्नाभिजल्पानुषङ्गिणी ॥ १२६४ ॥

aśakyasamayo hyātmā nīlādīnāmananyabhāk |
teṣāmataśca saṃvittirnābhijalpānuṣaṅgiṇī || 1264 ||

The nature of the blue and other things, being individually specific, is incapable of having any convention in regard to it; the perception of these things, therefore, cannot be associated with words.—(1264)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The nature—essence—of the Blue and other things is such that no Convention can be made in regard to them.

The question being—“why is it so?”,—the answer is ‘being individually specific’; that is, it is incapable of being present at the time of usage; and Convention is for the purpose of usage alone; hence there can be no Convention in regard to it.

Further, there is Convention only when the thing concerned has already become cognised,—not while it remains uncognised, unknown; and until the Perception has come about, it cannot apprehend the Blue, etc.; and as soon as it has come about, it would (according to the Opponent) at once associate it with words; but at the time that the Perception actually appears,—and also at the time of the apprehension of the related verbal expression,—the perceived thing, being momentary, cannot be present, and hence the Perception cannot apprehend it; by what then, and with what, would the Word be associated? From all this it is clear that the nature of the Blue and other things is incapable of having any convention in regard to it.

Of these’—i.e. of the Blue and other things.

Cannot he associated, etc. etc.’—i.e. the verbal expression cannot enter into it.

The argument may be formulated thus:—When a thing is such that no Convention is known in regard to it,—there can be no ‘determinate’ Perception of it,—e.g. the Visual Perception of Odour;—and the Perception of the Blue, etc. is such that no Convention is known in regard to it,—hence the idea of the Perception being ‘determinate’ would involve a notion contrary to a wider proposition.—(1264)

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