Verse 1237

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

एवं न्यायमुखग्रन्थो व्याख्यातव्यो दिशाऽनया ।
ज्ञानमित्यभिसम्बन्धात्प्रतीतिस्तत्र चोदिता ॥ १२३७ ॥

evaṃ nyāyamukhagrantho vyākhyātavyo diśā'nayā |
jñānamityabhisambandhātpratītistatra coditā || 1237 ||

Thus in this way is the passage from the nyāyamukha to be explained, by mentioning the ‘cognition it is the ‘idea associated with words’ that has been indicated.—(1237)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The relevant passage from the Nyāyamukha is as follows:—‘That Cognition of the form of things which, through the imposed identity of the qualifying and denotative adjuncts, appears as non-determinate, in connection with each of the sense-organs,—is Sense-perception’.—Here the ‘qualifying adjunct’ stands for the Universal, etc,—and the ‘denotative adjunct’ for the Name; the ‘imposition of the identity of these two’—with the things possessing the Universal, etc. and also with the thing hearing the Name.—The ‘imposition of identity’ is mentioned only by way of illustration; in some cases where the adjuncts are apprehended as distinct—e.g. when it is said ‘the Universal Cow subsists in this’, ‘the name of this is so and so’,—there also the presence of the Conceptual Content is admitted.

Objection:—“It has nowhere been said that the subsequent resultant Idea constitutes the Conceptual Content; how then do you get at the idea of the said Conceptual Content (from the words of the passage cited)?”

Answer;—‘By mentioning the Cognition, etc. etc.’—That is to say, when the passage, in contradistinction to the Conceptual Content, mentions the Cognition as ‘Sense-perception’, it clearly indicates that the Conceptual Content is a property of the Cognition. Thus the meaning of the passage comes to be this:—That Cognition, wliich, through the imposition of the identity of Name, etc. appears as non-determinate, is Sense-perception; that Cognition, on the other hand, which is determinate is of the nature of the Conceptual Content, and hence it is not Sense-perception; and the implication of this is that Conceptual Content consists in the Idea associated with words as contradistinguished from Sense-perception.—In this way the passage has presented the Teacher’s own as also other people’s views.—(1237)

Or, it may be that in the passage under reference, the Teacher has stated only his own view.—This is explained in the following—[see verse 1238 next]