The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1210 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1210.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

स्वस्य स्वस्यावभासस्य वेदनेऽपि स वर्त्तते ।
बाह्यार्थाध्यवसाये यद्द्वयोरपि समो यतः ॥ १२१० ॥

svasya svasyāvabhāsasya vedane'pi sa varttate |
bāhyārthādhyavasāye yaddvayorapi samo yataḥ || 1210 ||

Even though each person is cognisant of what appears to himself, yet there is something in the cognition of external things which is common to both persons.—(1210)


Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

As a matter of fact, the form of the cognition also is not accepted by us to be denoted by words,—in view of which the impossibility of Conventions relating to that could be reasonably urged against us. Because, for us all verbal usage is purely illusory, being assumed in accordance with the notions of individual persons,—it is as illusory and false as the idea of two moons that appears in the man of disordered vision; all that is produced by words is a Conceptual Content relating to the Thing, through the arousing of the Impressions of objectless conceptions; and it is the Reflection of this that is called the ‘Denotation’ of words, because it is produced by words,—not because they are denoted (expressed) by them.—So that though, in reality, the Speaker and the Listener are cognisant of what appears in their own consciousness,—yet inasmuch as the root of illusion is equally present in both men,—just as in the case of the man with the disordered vision,—the apprehension that the two men have of the external object is similar; and yet the idea in the mind of the Speaker is that ‘the thing that I cognise is also cognised by this man’; the Listener also has the same idea.—It might be asked—How is the fact of both of them apprehending the same thing known to each of them?—The answer to that is that in reality it is known to them; and yet the source of the Illusion being there, equally in both, there is—as already explained by us—a mistaken usage in accordance with each man’s own apprehension,—just as in the case of the perception of two moons by the man of disordered vision.—Thus then, both men having the apprehension of the same thing, the making of Convention is quite possible.—(1210)

An example is cited to illustrate the above:—[see verse 1211 next]

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