Verse 1105-1106

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तथाह्येकेन शब्देन सर्वथोक्तं स्वलक्षणम् ।
तथाचाभिहिते तस्मिन्कस्माद्भेदान्तरेऽभतिः ॥ ११०५ ॥
यदर्थमपरः शब्दः प्रयुज्येतात्र वस्तुतः ।
सर्वथाऽभिहिते नो चेत्तदनेकं प्रसज्यते ॥ ११०६ ॥

tathāhyekena śabdena sarvathoktaṃ svalakṣaṇam |
tathācābhihite tasminkasmādbhedāntare'bhatiḥ || 1105 ||
yadarthamaparaḥ śabdaḥ prayujyetātra vastutaḥ |
sarvathā'bhihite no cettadanekaṃ prasajyate || 1106 ||

By the single word, the specific individuality becomes expressed in its entirety; and when that has been denoted, why should there be non-cognition of other things,—for the sake of which another word would be pronounced,—when, in reality, the thing has been denoted in its entirety?—If not, then it becomes more than one.—(1105-1106)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Under the theory of those who hold that words denote positive entities when the single word ‘blue’ expresses the Specific Individuality of the Lotus and other (blue) things,—why should there be any absence of cognition of such other particular things as the Lotus and the Collyrium,—since the Blue Thing has been denoted in its entirety? Because the idea that one and the same thing should be both known and unknown to the same person involves self-contradiction. This is what is pointed out in the text by the words ‘Why should there, etc. etc.’.—‘Non-Cognition’ stands for bad cognition, i.e. doubtful and wrong cognition.

Thus there being no doubtful or wrong cognition, there can be no desire on the part of the speaker to pronounce any other word, such as ‘Lotus’ and the like. This is shown by the words ‘for the sake of which, etc. etc.’:—‘For the sake of which’,—i.e. for the purpose of removing which noncognition.

It might be argued that—“when the Blue thing has been denoted by the single word ‘blue’, it has been denoted only in part, not in its entirety; hence for the purpose of speaking of other characteristics of the Blue Thing, another word is sought after”.

The answer to this is—‘When in reality, etc. etc.’. There are no parts in any single object, by virtue of which there could be denotation in part; because the one (whole) and the many (parts) are mutual contradictories, one being the negation of the other; so that what your explanation does is to establish as many distinct things as there may be parts; and hence there would be no such concepts as ‘one’ and ‘many’.—(1105-1106)