The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1093 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1093.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

न हि तेष्वस्ति सामान्यं वाच्यं तस्य च वाचकम् ।
न वाचकत्वं शब्दस्य क्षणभङ्गि स्वलक्षणम् ॥ १०९३ ॥

na hi teṣvasti sāmānyaṃ vācyaṃ tasya ca vācakam |
na vācakatvaṃ śabdasya kṣaṇabhaṅgi svalakṣaṇam || 1093 ||

As a matter of fact, there is ho ‘universal’ (commonalty) in the case of the things in question, which could be denoted; nor is there any universal word denotative of that universal; nor does the denotative character belong to the word, as specific individualities are all in perpetual flux.—(1093)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged by the other party:—“In the case of things like Mahāśvetā, the denotedng, in the shape of the Universal, is real,—and also the word denoting them; and hence their case does not falsify our Premiss.”

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 1093 above]

In course of our examination of the ‘Universal’, we have rejected, in great detail, the whole conception of the ‘Universal’; hence the assertion that the ‘Universal’ is the denoted and denoter in the case in question makes the Reason ‘false’ (Inconclusive).

Tasya’—of the Universal.

The term ‘Universal’ has to be taken as understood after ‘denotative’ which connects it with the context.

It might be argued that—“Even though there is no real entity denoted in the case, yet the denotative certainly is there in the shape of the Specific Individuality of the word ‘Mahāśvetā.’ etc.”.

The answer to this is—‘Nor does the denotative, etc. etc.’—that is, it has been shown that the ‘Perpetual Flux’ embraces all things; hence the Specific Individuality of words cannot be denotative, because as it is momentary, it could not form the subject of any Convention; also because it could not be concomitant with the time of usage; as explained before.—(1093)

The following Text sums up the argument:—[see verse 1094 next]

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