The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1027 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1027.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तस्य नार्थानपेक्षत्वं पारम्पर्यात्तदागतेः ।
तेनात्मना च वस्तुत्वं नैवास्तीत्युपपादितम् ॥ १०२७ ॥

tasya nārthānapekṣatvaṃ pāramparyāttadāgateḥ |
tenātmanā ca vastutvaṃ naivāstītyupapāditam || 1027 ||

It is not entirely independent of the object, inasmuch as the notion of that comes in indirectly; and yet in that form, the character of positive entity does not belong to it, as explained before.—(1027)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued (under 921, by Kumārila) that—“if the denotation of words is independent of things, then the assumption of Apoha is useless”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 1027 above]

There is an indirect concomitance with the object; hence, even though the conception is primarily mistaken and illusory,—yet it is not entirely independent of the external object; just as the idea of ‘jewel’ in the brightness of the jewel (though wrong, is not independent of the jewel). Hence ‘independence of the external object’ is something not admitted by us.

As regards the argument (urged in Text 922, by Kumārila) that—“the cognition that is produced in regard to the denotation of words is in the form of the positive entity”,—the answer is given in the words—‘and yet in that form, etc, etc.’,—that is, even though the cognition is in the form of the positive entity, yet, the positive character that belongs to it is not in the form of something external, nor in the form of another cognition; as has been explained under Text 1014.—This also sets aside the view that ‘the Apoha of other Cognitions’ is not apprehended by a Cognition; because it is actually apprehended indirectly, by implication.—(1027)

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