The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 972 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 972.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अथान्याअथाप्यपोहवद्वस्तु वाच्यमित्यभिधीयते |
तत्रापि परतन्त्रत्वाद्व्याप्तिः शब्देन दुर्लभा || 972 ||

athānyāathāpyapohavadvastu vācyamityabhidhīyate |
tatrāpi paratantratvādvyāptiḥ śabdena durlabhā || 972 ||

“If it be said that what is denoted is the entity along with the Apoha,—there also, concomitance with the word would be unattainable, as it would be dependent upon something else.”—[Ślokavārtika-Apoha 120]—(972)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged:—‘If it were mere exclusion that is denoted by the word, then there would be room for the said objection; as a matter of fact, however, what is denoted is the entity along with the exclusion; consequently the two words having the two exclusions as their adjuncts could very well apply to a single entity alone with the Apoha; so that the co-ordination would be there all right’.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 972 above]

There also’,—i.e. in the Entity along with the Apoha being regarded as denoted by the word,—the ‘concomitance’—i.e. indication—of the various variations of the non-blue Lotus with the word ‘Blue’—would be unattainable;—why?—because the word—‘Blue’—would be dependent upon something else; inasmuch as it denotes the object only as subordinate to the Exclusion,—and not directly; and as there is no direct denotation, there could be no indication of its variations; just as the word ‘sweet’ does not indicate the white colour; though as things stand, the white colour is a variety of the non-sweet, yet, the potency of the word lies in the indication of the varieties of only that which it denotes directly, and not in that of the variety of what is denoted through the intervention of something else. Consequently, as there would be no indication, by the word ‘blue’, of the varieties of the Lotus, this latter could not be its variety; and when it could not be its variety, no co-ordination would be possible.

Thus, then, the objection that you have yourself urged against the denotation of the Individual as endowed with the Universal,—by the statement that ‘the word cannot denote that which possesses the Universal, because it is not independent’,—is applicable also to the view that what is denoted is the entity along with the exclusion. This is what has been made clear by the Text. That is to say, if the denotation of the word consisted of the Entity along with the ‘Universal’, then the word ‘Sat’, ‘Being’, ‘Existence’, would express the substance with the form of the ‘Universal’ as its subordinate factor, and not directly; because it does not indicate the varieties in the shape of the Jar and other things; and in the event of the varieties not being indicated, there can be no co-ordination, as already pointed out. This same incongruity is equally applicable to the view that what is denoted is the entity along with the Exclusion; as in this case also the word ‘sat’ would express the substance with the Exclusion as its subordinate factor, and not directly; and the non-indication of varieties would be present here also. What then would be the difference between the ‘Universal’ and the ‘Exclusion’—or between ‘that having the Universal’ and‘that having the Exclusion’?—(972)

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