The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 902-905 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 902-905.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

प्रतिभाऽपि च शब्दार्थो बाह्यार्थविषया यदि ।
एकात्मनियते बाह्ये विचित्राः प्रतिभाः कथम् ॥ ९०२ ॥
अथ निर्विषया एता वासनामात्रभावतः ।
प्रतिपत्तिः प्रवृत्तिर्वा बाह्यार्थेषु कथं भवेत् ॥ ९०३ ॥
बाह्यरूपाधिमोक्षेण स्वाकारे यदि ते मते ।
शब्दार्थोऽतात्त्विकः प्राप्तस्तथा भ्रान्त्या प्रवर्त्तनात् ॥ ९०४ ॥
निर्बीजा न च सा युक्ता सर्वत्रैव प्रसङ्गतः ।
इतरेतरभेदोऽस्य बीजं चेत्पक्ष एष नः ॥ ९०५ ॥

pratibhā'pi ca śabdārtho bāhyārthaviṣayā yadi |
ekātmaniyate bāhye vicitrāḥ pratibhāḥ katham || 902 ||
atha nirviṣayā etā vāsanāmātrabhāvataḥ |
pratipattiḥ pravṛttirvā bāhyārtheṣu kathaṃ bhavet || 903 ||
bāhyarūpādhimokṣeṇa svākāre yadi te mate |
śabdārtho'tāttvikaḥ prāptastathā bhrāntyā pravarttanāt || 904 ||
nirbījā na ca sā yuktā sarvatraiva prasaṅgataḥ |
itaretarabhedo'sya bījaṃ cetpakṣa eṣa naḥ || 905 ||

As regards ‘intuition’, which has been regarded as the ‘import of words’,—if it appertains to the external object, then, inasmuch as the external object has one particular character, how could there be various ‘intuitions’?—If the ‘intuitions’ be held to be objectless, and existing only in the form of faculties,—then how could there be either comprehension or activity regarding external things?—If it be held that these two (cognition and activity) abandon the external form and rest within themselves,—then the import of words becomes unreal, false—as proceeding through illusion.—Nor can intuition be held to be baseless; as in that case, it should appear everywhere.—If the basis of it be held to consist in the ‘mutual exclusion’ among things,—then that is exactly our view.—(902-905)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Author points out the objections against the view that it is ‘Intuition’ that is brought about by words (set forth in Text 892):—[see verses 902-905 above]

If ‘Intuition’ is really based upon the external object, then it cannot be possible for various Intuitions to appear in persons living at mutually incompatible times, relating to any single thing like Sound; because what is one cannot have several natures.

If Intuitions are devoid of objects, then Activity and Comprehension in connection with objects should not be possible; as the word would have no connection with objects.

If it be held that—“the Comprehension and Activity come about under illusion, the object being imposed upon what is objectless”,—then the Import of Words becomes illusory, mistaken; and of this Illusion, some cause has to be found; otherwise, if there were no cause of the Illusion, it should appear everywhere and at all times.—If the mutual exclusion among things be held to be the cause of the illusion, then you support our own view, and as such your argument becomes superfluous.—(902-905)

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