by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588
This page describes verse 898-901 of the Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita (8th century), including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: both dealing with philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattva-sangraha (aka Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 verses.
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:
निर्द्धारितस्वरूपाणां द्रव्यादीनां तु योगतः ।
सम्बन्धो यच्च सामान्यं सत्यं तद्वारितं पुरा ॥ ८९८ ॥
भेदजात्यादिरूपेण शब्दार्थानुपपत्तितः ।
अर्थेनैकीकृतं रूपं न शब्दस्योपपद्यते ॥ ८९९ ॥
जल्पो बुद्धिस्थ एवायं बाह्ययोगविभेदतः ।
ततः को भेद एतस्य बुद्धिपक्षादनन्तरात् ॥ ९०० ॥
बुद्ध्याकारोऽपि शब्दार्थः प्रागेव विनिवारितः ।
ज्ञानादव्यतिरिक्तस्य व्यापकत्ववियोगतः ॥ ९०१ ॥
nirddhāritasvarūpāṇāṃ dravyādīnāṃ tu yogataḥ |
sambandho yacca sāmānyaṃ satyaṃ tadvāritaṃ purā || 898 ||
bhedajātyādirūpeṇa śabdārthānupapattitaḥ |
arthenaikīkṛtaṃ rūpaṃ na śabdasyopapadyate || 899 ||
jalpo buddhistha evāyaṃ bāhyayogavibhedataḥ |
tataḥ ko bheda etasya buddhipakṣādanantarāt || 900 ||
buddhyākāro'pi śabdārthaḥ prāgeva vinivāritaḥ |
jñānādavyatiriktasya vyāpakatvaviyogataḥ || 901 ||
Any sort of relation among substance and the rest, whose nature has been duly ascertained, as also any real ‘universal’,—has been already discarded.—(898)
Inasmuch as the import of words cannot consist of particulars or universals, there can be no form of the word as coalesced (identified) with its denotation. Then again, this ‘coalescence’ also must reside in the cognition itself, inasmuch as it is different from external relationship. Under the circumstances, what would be the difference between this view and the view that the cognition or idea itself constitutes the import of words?—As regards the view that the form of the idea (or cognition) is what is denoted by words,—that has been already rejected, on the ground that it would be nothing different from the idea and as such could not be pervasive.—(899-901)
Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):
The author next states the objections against the two views set forth (under Texts 888 and 889) regarding ‘the Unreal Contact, etc.’:—[see verse 898 above]
In course of the examination of the Six Categories, any such relation as Conjunction and Inherence has been rejected;—under the examination of the Sāṃkhya doctrines, we have rejected the idea that the ‘Universal’ is real and consists of the three Attributes, and is not-different (from the Particular Products);—and the ‘Universal’ as something different from the Particulars has been rejected in course of the examination of the Six Categories;—hence the Import of Words cannot consist either of ‘the conjunction of the Unreal’, or of ‘the Real Universal with Unreal Adjuncts’.—(898)
The following Text points out objections against the view that what is denoted is ‘Coalescence’:—[see verses 899-901 above]
If there were such a thing as the ‘denotation’ of the word, then it might become coalesced with it; but in so far as it has been proved that no ‘denotation’ of the Word is possible, in the form of ‘Specific Individuality’ and the rest,—how could there be any ‘coalescing’ with it?
Then again, the said ‘Coalescence’ also must reside in the Cognition only. Because the external Word and the external Object (denoted) must be distinct by reason of their being perceived by different sense-organs and so forth; hence any real coalescence or identification of these cannot be right. The ‘Coalescence’, therefore, that is proper is only of such Word and Object as reside in the Cognition. So that when the Word, having taken up the form of the denoted Object, has its verbal character obscured, and appears in the Cognition,—it introduces the objective element into its subjective form; and it is then that it comes to be described as ‘abhijalpa’, ‘Coalescence This must be a form within the Cognition itself, and nothing exterior to it; because what is exterior must be of an entirely distinct character.
Under the circumstances, what would be the difference between this view and the other one by which the Cognition or Idea itself is regarded as the Import of Words?—None at all. In both cases the denotation would be purely subjective; the only difference being that the word and the denotation had coalesced and become one.
Both these views would be open to the same objection. How could that which is non-different from Cognition be something different? This is what is shown in the words—‘As regards the view that the form of the Cognition, etc. etc.’.—(899-901)