The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 876-877 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 876-877.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अशक्यं समय(स्यास्य जातेऽजाते च कल्पनम्) ।
नाजाते समयो युक्तो भाविकोऽश्वविषाणवत् ॥ ८७६ ॥
उप(नापि?)जाते गृहीता(नां पूर्वं) वाचामनुस्मृतौ ।
क्रियते समयस्तत्र चिरातीते(कथं नु तत्) ॥ ८७७ ॥

aśakyaṃ samaya(syāsya jāte'jāte ca kalpanam) |
nājāte samayo yukto bhāviko'śvaviṣāṇavat || 876 ||
upa(nāpi?)jāte gṛhītā(nāṃ pūrvaṃ) vācāmanusmṛtau |
kriyate samayastatra cirātīte(kathaṃ nu tat) || 877 ||

As a matter of fact, there can be no assumption of convention in regard either to the born or to the unborn thing. there can be no real convention relating to the unborn,—as there can be none relating to the horse’s horn;—nor one in regard to the born thing; because convention is made only on the recalling to mind of things apprehended beforehand;—how could this be done in regard to what has passed away long ago?—(876-877)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has thus been established that there can be no Convention bearing upon ‘Specific Individuality,—because Usage being impossible in connection with it, the Convention would be useless. It is now going to be shown that no Convention is possible in regard to it because no Action is possible:—[see verses 876-877 above]

It has been already proved that allngs become destroyed immediately after appearance (birth); if then Convention were made regarding them, it could be made either before they were born, or after they were born;—it is not possible for any real Convention to be made relating to what is still unborn; because what does not exist can have no character at all and hence cannot be the substratum of anything.—The Text has used the term ‘real’ in order to exclude the illusory. Hence the assertion does not become vitiated by the well-known case of the Convention whereby the name of an unborn son is fixed upon beforehand; because such convention is purely illusory, bearing, as it does, upon an object which is the creation of fancy.

As in the Horse’s Horn’;—the affix ‘vati’ is added to the word ending with the Locative.

Nor can the Convention be made relating to the thing after it is born; because a Convention regarding anything can be made only when the thing has been apprehended, and this apprehension has been followed by the remembrance of its name and distinguishing features; it could not be made otherwise than this; as it would lead to incongruities. Thus then, at the time of the remembrance of the name and the distinguishing features, the ‘Specific Individuality’ of the thing—being momentary—will have long disappeared; so that, as in regard to the unborn, so in regard to the born thing also, there can be no real Convention; as at the time of the making of the Convention, both would be equally absent. In fact, even at the time at which thing is actually apprehended, the ‘Specific Individuality’ that forms the basis of that apprehension, being momentary, is not in existence; how much less possible is it at a later time, when there is remembrance of the uniformity of things appearing long after that apprehension?—(876-877)

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