The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]
by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588
This page contains verse 871 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 871.
Verse 871
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:
यतः स्वलक्षणं जातिस्तद्योगो जातिमांस्तथा ।
बुद्ध्याकारो न शब्दार्थे घटामञ्चति तत्त्वतः ॥ ८७१ ॥yataḥ svalakṣaṇaṃ jātistadyogo jātimāṃstathā |
buddhyākāro na śabdārthe ghaṭāmañcati tattvataḥ || 871 ||‘Specific individuality’, ‘universal ‘relation to universal’, ‘something endowed with the universal ‘form of the cognition of the object’,—none of these really find a place in the ‘import of words—(871)
Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):
The following Text proceeds to show that the Reason adduced is not ‘unproven’—[see verse 871 above]
That is to say, when the ‘Import of words’ is held to consist in an object in regard to which a Convention has been duly apprehended,—such import would consist, either (1) in ‘Specific Individuality’, or (2) in ‘Universal’, or (3) in ‘Relation to the Universal’,—the pronoun ‘tat’ in the compound ‘tadyogaḥ’ standing for the Universal,—or (4) in ‘something endowed with the Universal’,—or (5) in ‘the form of the Cognition of the object These are the only alternatives possible.—In the case of everyone of these, no Convention is possible; and hence it cannot form the ‘Import of Words’,
‘Really’;—this has been added in order to indicate that the author does not deny the illusory ‘import of words’; and hence there is no self-contradiction in terms; otherwise there -would be a self-contradiction involved in his Proposition; inasmuch as it could not be possible to assert that ‘Specific Individuality and the rest do not constitute the Import of words’, without speaking of them by means of these words; so that by speaking of these by their names, for the purpose of proving his proposition, he would be admitting the fact that these are capable of being expressed by words;—and yet this fact is denied in the Proposition; so that there would be self-contradiction.
This explanation answers Uddyotakara’s assertion to the effect that “if words are inexpressive, then there is contradiction between the Proposition and the Premiss”.—Because we do not entirely deny the fact of words having their ‘import’; for the simple reason that this is well-known even to the meanest cowherd. What we do deny, however, is the character of Reality which the other party impose upon the Import,—not the Import itself.—(871)