Verse 867-868

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

यदि नोपाधयः केचिद्विद्यन्ते (परमार्थतः) ।
(दण्डी शुक्लश्चलत्यस्ति गौ)रिहेत्यादिधी(ध्वनी) ॥ ८६७ ॥
(स्यातां) किंविषयावेतौ नानिमित्तौ च तौ मतौ ।
सर्वस्मिन्नविभागेन तयोर्वृत्तिरसम्भवी ॥ ८६८ ॥

yadi nopādhayaḥ kecidvidyante (paramārthataḥ) |
(daṇḍī śuklaścalatyasti gau)rihetyādidhī(dhvanī) || 867 ||
(syātāṃ) kiṃviṣayāvetau nānimittau ca tau matau |
sarvasminnavibhāgena tayorvṛttirasambhavī || 868 ||

“If adjuncts do not exist in reality, then on what basis would there be such cognitions and verbal expressions as ‘the man with the stick’, ‘the white’, ‘move’, ‘exists’, ‘cow’, ‘here’ and so forth?—They cannot be held to be baseless. nor can they apply promiscuously to all things.”—(867-868)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Author proceeds to set forth the Introduction to the arguments in support of the view (set forth in Text 2) that the Truth is ‘amenable to Words and Cognitions only in an assumed (superimposed) form’:—[see verses 867-868 above]

“What is apprehended by Word and Cognition is a Real Entity; hence what words express by means of affirmation and denial is only the real state of things”;—such is the view of the Realists.—The view of the Negationists (Apohists), on the other hand, is as follows:—“There is nothing real that is expressed by words; all verbal cognition is wrong, because it proceeds by imposing non-difference upon things that are really different; in a case where there is indirect connection with an entity, there is some sort of agreement with the object, even though the Cognition is really wrong”. Such is the view of these people. The one uniform, non-different, form that is imposed upon things proceeds on the strength of the apprehension of things in the form of the ‘exclusion of other things’; and it being itself of the nature of the ‘exclusion or negation of other things’, it is mistaken by people under the spell of illusion to be one with that which is excluded by it,—and it ultimately brings about the apprehension of the thing ‘excluded’ from others for these reasons it comes to be known as ‘excluded frorn other things’. On this ground it has been held that what is expressed by words is Apoha, the ‘negation of others’.

The Realists urge the following objections (against the Apohist, Negationist, Bauddha):—“If,—according to you,—for Verbal Cognition, there is no real basis as the adjuncts—qualifying factors—in the shape of Substance, Quality, Action, Universal, Ultimate Individuality and Inherence,—then how is it that among people, there are such verbal expressions and cognitions as ‘the man with the stick’, which are all based upon adjuncts in the shape of substance, etc.? For instance, such expressions and notions as ‘the man with the stick’, ‘the animal with horns’ are known to be based upon adjuncts in the shape of substances; such expressions and notions as ‘white’, ‘black’ are based upon adjuncts in the shape of qualities; such expressions and notions as ‘moves’, ‘wanders’ are based upon adjuncts in the shape of Action; such expressions and notions as ‘is’, ‘exists’ are based upon adjuncts in the shape of ‘Being’; such expressions and notions as ‘Cow’, ‘Horse’, ‘Elephant’ are based upon adjuncts in the shape of Universals and Particulars; and the expression and notion ‘The Cloth in these yarns’ are based upon Inherence.—If then, there did not exist any of these Substance and the rest, the expressions and notions of the ‘Man with the stick’ and other things would become baseless.—The term ‘ādi’ goes with every member of the compound. So that every one of such similar expressions and notions become included, as ‘the umbrella-holder’, ‘the horned animal’ and so forth.—As for the Ultimate Individualities, they are cognizable by mystics only; hence these are not meant to be included here.

“And yet it is not right that these expressions and notions should be regarded as entirely baseless. If they were so, they would be equally liable to appear everywhere.

“Nor are they found to apply promiscuously to all things, without distinction.

“From all this it follows that Substance and the rest do really exist.

“The argument may be formulated as follows:—Expressions and notions that appear in mutually distinct forms must have a real basis,—like the Auditory and other notions;—the expressions and notions of the ‘stick -holder’, etc. do appear in distinct forms;—hence this is a natural reason (for regarding them as having a real basis).—If they had no such basis, things would appear in all places without distinction this is the argument setting aside a contrary conclusion.”—(867-868)

The Author proceeds to refute the above Reasoning (of the Realist) in the following—[see verse 869 next]