Verse 865-866

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अथान्य एव संयोगविभागबहुतादिवत् ।
सम्बन्ध्यन्तरसद्भावे समवायोऽवतिष्ठते ॥ ८६५ ॥
संयोगादिवदेवं हि नन्वस्य बहुता भवेत् ।
एवमाद्यस्य सद्भावे बहु स्यादसमञ्जसम् ॥ ८६६ ॥

athānya eva saṃyogavibhāgabahutādivat |
sambandhyantarasadbhāve samavāyo'vatiṣṭhate || 865 ||
saṃyogādivadevaṃ hi nanvasya bahutā bhavet |
evamādyasya sadbhāve bahu syādasamañjasam || 866 ||

(b) If, on the other hand, the ‘inherence’ that continues to exist, while the other relative is there, is something different,—as in the case of conjunction, disjunction, plurality and so forth,—then, in that case, there would be plurality of inherence also, just as there is of conjunction, etc.—Thus, if ‘inherence’ is postulated to exist, then there would be this and many other incongruities.—(865-866)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

(B) If the second alternative,—that what continues to exist is something else,—is accepted, then, there should be plurality of ‘Inherence’, just as there is of Conjunction, etc.; and this would involve the surrendering of the doctrine that there is no diversity in Inherence.

‘This and many other incongruities’;—this is meant to include such incongruities as—(a) ‘the Futility of the Cause’, (b) ‘the contradiction of several aphorisms’, (c) incompatibility with facts of Perception, etc., (d) ‘the simultaneous birth of all things’.

(а) For instance, the ‘birth’ of a thing is described as ‘inherence in the cause’ or ‘inherence in Being’; and Inherence is eternal; hence causes could not have any capacity to bring about the birth of the effect; hence causes would be futile.

(b) There would be contradiction of such (Vaiśeṣika) aphorisms as—“Conjunction is brought about by the action of either of the two factors, by the action of both, and by Conjunction”, “Cognition is produced by the contact of the Sense-organ and the object, etc. etc.”

(c) The doctrine in question goes against the idea of the Eye, etc. being the cause of Perceptional and other cognitions.

(d) Birth, in the shape of ‘Inherence’, being eternal, there can be no sequence in the birth of things,—which will have to be regarded as simultaneous; this would be an incongruity, and it would also go against the Opponent’s own doctrine that “the non-simultaneity of Cognitions is indicative of the Mind.”

Lastly, the Birth of things being eternal,—the entire world would consist of things which could not benefit, or be benefited by, others; and hence the propounding of the Philosophy would be futile; and so on and so forth, there would be many incongruities, which would cut off and smash the entire fabric of the Opponent’s Philosophy.—(865-866)

End of Chapter XV.