Verse 860-864

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

यद्येवं ये विनश्यन्ति घटाद्याः समवायिनः ।
तेषां वृत्त्यात्मको योऽसौ समवायः प्रकल्पितः ॥ ८६० ॥
स एव व्यवतिष्ठेत किं सम्बन्ध्यन्तरस्थितेः ।
अथान्य एव संयोग........बहुतादिवत् ॥ ८६१ ॥
नाद्यस्तल्लक्षणस्यैव समवायस्य संस्थितौ ।
पूर्ववत्ते स्थिता एव प्राप्नुवन्ति घटादयः ॥ ८६२ ॥
न तेषामनवस्थाने तेषां (वृत्त्यात्मकः क्वचित्) ।
सम(वायोऽ)वतिष्ठेत संज्ञामात्रेण वा तथा ॥ ८६३ ॥
अतः प्रागपि सद्भावान्न ते वृत्ताः स्युराश्रये ।
पश्चादिव तथा ह्येषा वृत्तिस्तेषामवस्तुतः ॥ ८६४ ॥

yadyevaṃ ye vinaśyanti ghaṭādyāḥ samavāyinaḥ |
teṣāṃ vṛttyātmako yo'sau samavāyaḥ prakalpitaḥ || 860 ||
sa eva vyavatiṣṭheta kiṃ sambandhyantarasthiteḥ |
athānya eva saṃyoga........bahutādivat || 861 ||
nādyastallakṣaṇasyaiva samavāyasya saṃsthitau |
pūrvavatte sthitā eva prāpnuvanti ghaṭādayaḥ || 862 ||
na teṣāmanavasthāne teṣāṃ (vṛttyātmakaḥ kvacit) |
sama(vāyo')vatiṣṭheta saṃjñāmātreṇa vā tathā || 863 ||
ataḥ prāgapi sadbhāvānna te vṛttāḥ syurāśraye |
paścādiva tathā hyeṣā vṛttisteṣāmavastutaḥ || 864 ||

If it is as explained, then when certain inherent objects like the jar have ceased to exist,—what is it that continues to exist? (a) Is it that inherence which has been assumed to constitute the existence of those objects, which inherence continues to exist in the other relatives? Or (b) is it something else, as in the case of conjunction, plurality and so forth?—(a) It cannot be the former; if the inherence of that kind continues to exist, then the said objects—jar, etc.—also should be there. If they were not there, then the inherence that constitutes their existence could not remain there; or it might be there in mere name.—From all this it follows that even before, as after, the objects could not be subsisting in their substratum, through any such thing as ‘inherence’. Thus this ‘subsistence’ of theirs cannot be real.—(860-864)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

When the Jar, and other things that are held to ‘inhere’ in their cause, cease to exist—what is it that continues to exist?—(A) Is it the ‘Inherence’ that has been assumed as constituting their existence in their cause,—this Inherence continuing to exist in Relatives other than the Jar, etc.?—(B) Or is it something else,—like Conjunction and Plurality, which vary with each Conjunct?—The term ‘ādi’ is meant to include Disjunction.

If the former alternative is accepted, then the Jar, etc. should still continue to exist, because there would be no falling off of the nature of their existence, which (in the shape of Inherence) would be just as it was before their destruction. Or, if the Jar, etc. did not continue to exist, as their existence would not be there, the Inherence also could not be there; or otherwise the Inherence could not constitute the existence of those things. If the mere existence of Inherence were postulated as something independent of all things and not benefiting anything,—then it would be something only in name; and there would be no corresponding reality; and under the circumstances to assert that ‘Inherence constitutes the existence of things’ would be mere verbiage.

This is what is made clear in the words—‘From all this it follows, etc. etc.’—‘They’—the Jar, etc.—could not be subsisting in their substratum., on the strength of any such thing as ‘Inherence’,—‘As after’,—i.e. after the destruction of their constituent cause, when they have really no existence at all.

‘Thus this, etc.’—explains the real sense of the Reason adduced.—(866-864)