Verse 789-795

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

इच्छारचितरूपादावर्थे जातिर्न विद्यते ।
व्यक्तेरसम्भवादेव स्थिता तद्व्यभिचारिता ॥ ७८९ ॥
अतीतानुपजातेषु नित्यसामान्यगोचरम् ।
ज्ञानं चेत्केवलं चेदं सामान्यं गृह्यते न तु ॥ ७९० ॥
केवलस्योपलम्भे वा न व्यक्तीनामिदं भवेत् ।
सामान्यं न च तद्व्यङ्ग्यं विन्ध्यस्येव हिमालयः ॥ ७९१ ॥
नोत्पत्तिपारतन्त्र्येण प्रतिबद्धं हि तास्विदम् ।
न ज्ञानपारतन्त्र्यं च नित्यत्वात्केवलग्रहात् ॥ ७९२ ॥
स्वाश्रयेन्द्रिययोगादिव्यपेक्षाया असम्भवात् ।
तत्सदैवोपलभ्येत यदि वा न कदाचन ॥ ७९३ ॥
स्वात्मनि ज्ञानजनने योग्यं वाऽयोग्यमेव वा ।
यद्येकदा तदा रूपं सर्वदैव हि तद्भवेत् ॥ ७९४ ॥
तस्य योग्यमयोग्यं वा रूपं यत्प्रकृतिस्थितम् ।
तद्ध्रौव्यादप्रकम्प्यं हि को नाम चलयिष्यति ॥ ७९५ ॥

icchāracitarūpādāvarthe jātirna vidyate |
vyakterasambhavādeva sthitā tadvyabhicāritā || 789 ||
atītānupajāteṣu nityasāmānyagocaram |
jñānaṃ cetkevalaṃ cedaṃ sāmānyaṃ gṛhyate na tu || 790 ||
kevalasyopalambhe vā na vyaktīnāmidaṃ bhavet |
sāmānyaṃ na ca tadvyaṅgyaṃ vindhyasyeva himālayaḥ || 791 ||
notpattipāratantryeṇa pratibaddhaṃ hi tāsvidam |
na jñānapāratantryaṃ ca nityatvātkevalagrahāt || 792 ||
svāśrayendriyayogādivyapekṣāyā asambhavāt |
tatsadaivopalabhyeta yadi vā na kadācana || 793 ||
svātmani jñānajanane yogyaṃ vā'yogyameva vā |
yadyekadā tadā rūpaṃ sarvadaiva hi tadbhavet || 794 ||
tasya yogyamayogyaṃ vā rūpaṃ yatprakṛtisthitam |
taddhrauvyādaprakampyaṃ hi ko nāma calayiṣyati || 795 ||

In the case of things created by imagination, there can be no universal subsisting in them; because there is no possibility of the existence of the individuals (that would make up the universals). Hence the ‘fallibility’ of the opponent’s reasons remains as before.—Similarly with regard to past and future things,—if there is a cognition of an eternal universal, then no such pure ‘universal’ (without the constituent individuals) can ever be apprehended. Or, if such a pure universal by itself were apprehended, then it could not be the ‘universal’ of any particulars. Such a universal could not be manifestable by particulars; just as the himālaya is not manifestable by the vindhya.—Nor can the universal be tied down to the particulars through its birth being dependent upon these,—nor lastly can the universal be dependent upon the particulars for its cognition, because it is eternal and because it is apprehended purely by itself.—There is also no possibility of its being dependent upon any such thing as the contact of its own substratum with the sense-organ concerned. Consequently this universal could either be apprehended at all times, or not apprehended at any time at all.—As regards its capacity to bring about its own cognition by itself, it may or may not have this capacity; whichsoever way it is, it would always remain so. Its natural form,—with or without the said capacity,—would be unshakeable, because it is itself permanent. Who then, could ever shake what is unshakeable?—(789-795)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been urged by the author above (under Text 749) that—‘in regard to persons created by imagination, and in regard to dead and unborn persons,—the notions of Negation appear without any all-embracing basis’, This argument is further elaborated in the following—[see verses 789-795 above]

The compound ‘īcchāracita, etc.’ is to be expounded as ‘that of which the form is created by imagination’: The term ‘ādi’ includes dead and unborn things.—There is no Universal subsisting in such imaginary things, on which the said notion could be based.

“There may be no Universal in regard to imaginary things; in regard to the past and future things, the notion could be due to the Universal”.

This is not true; the nature of things subsisting in other things is not such that they exist by themselves, without their substratum; if they did not exist, then they would cease to be subsistent.

Even if the subsistent things existed by themselves,—even so, the difficulty remains; because the other party also does not admit the apprehension of the Universal by itself. This has been thus declared by them—“The Universal depends for its cognition upon the contact of its substratum with the sense-organ”,

Further, if the Universal could be apprehended by itself, the cognition of the Particular Individuals could not be held to follow from the cognition of the Universal; because the Particular does not exist at the time that the Universal is apprehended by itself.

Nor would there be any connection between the Particulars and the Universal,—such as is involved in the notion that ‘this is the Universal of these Particulars’; as there would be no basis for such a connection.

For instance, if there were a basis for such connection, it could consist either, (a) in the fact of its being manifested by them, or (b) in its being produced by them, or (c) in its cognition being dependent upon their cognition.—(a) The Universal cannot be regarded as connected with these Particulars on account of its being manifested by them; because being permanent, it can have no peculiarity produced in it by anything else, hence it could not be manifested by anything else; when one thing does not confer any benefit upon another thing, it cannot serve as its manifester; for instance, the Himālaya is not the manifester of the Vindhya. The Particulars in the same way cannot be the manifester of the Universal. Hence the notion involved in the proposition is contrary to a wider proposition. If a thing that confers no benefit were to be regarded as the manifester, then there would be the absurdity that everything would be the manifester of everything else.—(6) For the same reason, because the Universal is held to be eternal, therefore it cannot be right to regard it as dependent upon the Particulars for its production.—(c) Inasmuch as there is apprehension of the pure Universal by itself, it could not be held to be dependent upon the Particulars for its cognition.—Thus all the three alternatives are impossible.

Hence the assertion that—“the Universal has its apprehension dependent upon the contact of its substratum with the sense-organ”—is not right; because there can be no ‘substratum’ for the Universal; how then could the Universal be dependent for its cognition upon the contact of the sense-organ with any such ‘substratum’?

The particle ‘ādi’ includes such conditions as the contact of the Mind and Soul, and the like (postulated by the Vaiśeṣikaḥ

Then again, as the Universal is eternal, and hence can have no peculiar features introduced into it by other things,—it cannot be dependent upon anything else. Consequently, if it is capable of bringing about its own cognition, then it should bring it about at all times; if it is incapable of bringing it about, then it could not bring it about at any time at all. Whatever its nature be—capable or incapable,—it could not alter it; or else it would lose its permanence; this has been thus declared—‘Its capacity or incapacity, which rests in its very nature,—who can destroy? As it is eternal and hence not amenable to treatment—(789-795)