by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588
This page contains verse 775-776 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 775-776.
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:
अनुरूपो हि संसर्गी स्यादित्यन्यार्थकल्पना ।
वैलक्षण्ये तु बुद्धीनामियदेवाश्रितं वरम् ॥ ७७५ ॥
सामर्थ्यनियमो ह्यत्र कल्पनीयो वरं स च ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां कल्पितो ज्ञातशक्तिषु ॥ ७७६ ॥
anurūpo hi saṃsargī syādityanyārthakalpanā |
vailakṣaṇye tu buddhīnāmiyadevāśritaṃ varam || 775 ||
sāmarthyaniyamo hyatra kalpanīyo varaṃ sa ca |
anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ kalpito jñātaśaktiṣu || 776 ||
The assumption of something else (as the cause of the comprehensive notion) is based upon the idea that the correlative of a thing should be of the same nature as that thing. but, even so, when the notions are diverse, it is far better to accept what has been just suggested (by us); as in this case, the restriction is due to the capacity of things; and it is far better to assume that which has been found to be true in regard to things whose capacity is well known,—through affirmative and negative premisses.—(775-776)
Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):
When you were expounding the reason for your conclusions to consist in the fact that they should have a basis similar to themselves, you had to postulate millions of ‘Universals’, If the ‘Universal’ also produces notions of diverse forms, then it is far better to assume this,—that is, that which has been actually found to have the capacity (of producing the said notions). As in so doing, there would not have to be an assumption of anything not actually seen.
Further, when you are asked the question—How is it that one and the same ‘Universal’ produces diverse notions?—You will have to say that “such is the restricted capacity of things that even though itself one, it is capable of producing notions of diverse forms”.—If such be the case, then why should not the assumption be that the determining factors consist in the diverse things themselves whose capacities are well known and fully ascertained? In doing this, nothing would be done which is not in strict accordance with experience.—(775-776)
The following might be urged—“Of the ‘Universal’ also, the capacity is well known and fully ascertained”.
The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 777 next]