Verse 740-742

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

सामान्यस्यापि नीलादिरूपत्वे गुणतोऽस्य कः ।
भेदो नानुगतश्चैको नीलादिरूपलक्ष्यते ॥ ७४० ॥
भासमानोऽपि चेदेष न विवेकेन लक्ष्यते ।
तत्कथं धीध्वनी व्यक्तौ वर्त्तेते तद्बलेन तौ ॥ ७४१ ॥
निश्चयात्मक एवायं सामान्यप्रत्ययः परैः ।
इष्टश्चाग्रहणे प्राप्ते युक्तं नानुपलक्षणम् ॥ ७४२ ॥

sāmānyasyāpi nīlādirūpatve guṇato'sya kaḥ |
bhedo nānugataścaiko nīlādirūpalakṣyate || 740 ||
bhāsamāno'pi cedeṣa na vivekena lakṣyate |
tatkathaṃ dhīdhvanī vyaktau varttete tadbalena tau || 741 ||
niścayātmaka evāyaṃ sāmānyapratyayaḥ paraiḥ |
iṣṭaścāgrahaṇe prāpte yuktaṃ nānupalakṣaṇam || 742 ||

If the ‘universal’ also were in the form of ‘blue’, then, what would be its difference from ‘quality’?—As a matter of fact, however, no all-comprehensive ‘blue’ is ever perceived. even though it may be manifesting itself, it is never perceived in a differentiated form. under the circumstances, how could the idea and name apply to the individual, on the basis of the said comprehensive notion?—Further, the other party holds the notion of the ‘universal’ to be definite and certain; consequently, its non-perception cannot be right, as that would imply that it is in cognisable.—(740-742)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Śaṅkarasvāmin has argued as follows:—“The ‘Universal’ Blue also is of the form of Blue; if it were not so, then there would be no such comprehensive idea as ‘Blue’; thus the Reason adduced by the Buddhist being not admitted, there is no annulment of the Naiyāyika’s Conclusion by Inference (as urged in the preceding Text, by the Author).”

This is answered in the following— [see verses 740-742 above]

Such, being the case, there can be no difference between the Quality ‘Blue’ and the ‘Universal’ Blue; as, ex hypothesis both have the same form.

It might be urged that—“the Quality ‘Blue’ is not something comprehensive, while the ‘Universal’ Blue embraces all that is blue at all times and at all places; and in this sense there is a difference between the forms of the two”.

The answer to this is that ‘no all-comprehensive Blue is ever perceived’, That is, as a matter of fact, any such comprehensive ‘Blue’ as distinct from the Quality Blue,—embracing all that is of the form of Blue,—is never perceived to manifest itself; as all that appears in Perception is a specific ‘Blue’ alone by itself. Even in the ‘determinate’ Cognition, there does not appear any second Blue; as that Cognition only ‘determines’ what has been perceived (by the previous indeterminate Perception).

It might be argued that—“Just as for the Bauddha, the Momentary Character of Things, though apparent, is not actually apprehended in its differentiated form by people with dull intelligence,—so the ‘Universal’ also”,

This cannot be right; as even so, the theory propounded by you—that “on the strength of the perception of the Universal there appear the single identical Name and Idea in regard to Individuals that are diverse”,—would become untenable; because if the qualifying factor is unperceived, there can be no perception of the qualified thing; e.g. until the Stick is seen, there can be no such notion as ‘the man with the stick’, Similarly in the case in question. Because the idea put forward by you is that Diversities (Individuals) by themselves are beyond the reach of Verbal Expression and Cognition;—and these diversities, which are by themselves beyond the reach of Cognition and Verbal Expression, would (under your theory) be cognised only on the strength of the perception of the ‘Universal’;—how, then, can the Cogniser not ‘perceive’ the Universal itself?

Further, for the man for whom Perception is always ‘indeterminate’, it may be right to say that ‘even though apparent, it is not apprehended’; as ‘Apprehension’ involves the functioning of the idea of Certitude; but for you, who hold all Perception to be determinate, it is not right that there should be no apprehension; as that would mean that there is no Cognition of it at all. In fact, the apprehension of objects by all certain Cognitions consists in their bringing about certitude; if then, they do not bring about this certitude, it comes to tins that they do not cognise or apprehend the object at all.—(740-742)