Verse 723-726

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

यथा धात्र्यभयादीनां नानारोगनिवर्तने ।
प्रत्येकं सह वा शक्तिर्नानात्वेऽप्युपलभ्यते ॥ ७२३ ॥
न तेषु विद्यते किंचित्सामान्यं तत्र शक्तिमत् ।
चिरक्षिप्रादिभेदेन रोगशान्त्युपलम्भतः ॥ ७२४ ॥
सामान्येऽतिशयः कश्चिन्नहि क्षेत्रादिभेदतः ।
एकरूपतया नित्यं धात्र्यादेस्तु स विद्यते ॥ ७२५ ॥
एवमत्यन्तभेदेऽपि केचिन्नियतशक्तितः ।
तुल्यप्रत्यवमर्शादेर्हेतुत्वं यान्ति नापरे ॥ ७२६ ॥

yathā dhātryabhayādīnāṃ nānāroganivartane |
pratyekaṃ saha vā śaktirnānātve'pyupalabhyate || 723 ||
na teṣu vidyate kiṃcitsāmānyaṃ tatra śaktimat |
cirakṣiprādibhedena rogaśāntyupalambhataḥ || 724 ||
sāmānye'tiśayaḥ kaścinnahi kṣetrādibhedataḥ |
ekarūpatayā nityaṃ dhātryādestu sa vidyate || 725 ||
evamatyantabhede'pi kecinniyataśaktitaḥ |
tulyapratyavamarśāderhetutvaṃ yānti nāpare || 726 ||

In the case of the dhātrī, harītakī, etc., it is pound that there is present in them, either singly or collectively, the potency to remove various diseases; and yet there is no ‘universal’ (community) in them which has that potency; because the cure op the diseases is found to be quick and delayed.—Nor can any diverse peculiar properties be produced in the ‘universal’, through the diversities op the soil, etc. because it remains always in one and the same form; the said diverse properties, however, are present in the dhātrī, etc.—Thus though, as a rule, things are entirely different, yet some of them having well-defined potencies are conceived of as similar, and hence these things become the basis of the conception of similarity, etc.,—not other things.—(723-726)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It might be urged—“without a comprehensive something, how can mutually distinct entities become the basis, directly or indirectly, of the notion of identity or unity?”

In anticipation of this question, the Author supplies the following explanation:—[see verses 723-726 above]

Dhātrī and some other fruits, though of entirely different forms, are yet, severally or jointly, endowed with the capacity to remove various diseases,—even without any comprehensive entity embracing them all.—It cannot be right to urge that—“even in this case it is only a comprehensive ‘Universal’ that does the effective act”; for the simple reason that there is no such common ‘Universal’ over them capable of performing the various fruitful acts. If there were such a common ‘Universal’, there could he no possibility of the notion that people have, of the capacity of removing diseases quickly or slowly that is found in only some Dhātrī, etc. and that at only certain times; as the ‘Universal’ would he of only one uniform character.—Nor can it be right to assert that—“the said Universal itself performs the diverse fruitful acts, when it acquires certain peculiar properties due to the soil as watered by milk and such things—because the ‘Universal’ is, ex hypothesi, eternal, and hence incapable of having any peculiar properties produced by anything else; and hence no such properties could be produced in it by the diversities of Soil and such things; because the ‘Universal’ is always of one and the same form. As for the Dhātrī, etc.; on the other hand, they are evanescent things and hence diverse properties are produced in them by the diversities of Soil, etc.; and hence they become endowed with the diverse potencies of curing diseases.—In the same manner, other things also, like the Jar, are produced out of their Causal Ideas in such forms that by their very nature they come to be conceived of as of one and the same form. Hence there is no difficulty in this case.

The term ‘etc.’ in the expression ‘the basis of the conception of similarity, etc.’, is meant to include the capacity to perform such fruitful acts as the holding of water and the like.—(723-726)