Verse 709-711

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तत्रेयं द्विविधा जातिः परैरभ्युपगम्यते ।
सामान्यमेव सत्ताख्यं समस्तेष्वनुवृत्तितः ॥ ७०९ ॥
द्रव्यत्वादि तु सामान्यं सद्विशेषोऽभिधीयते ।
स्वाश्रयेष्वनुवृत्तस्य चेतसो हेतुभावतः ॥ ७१० ॥
विजातिभ्यश्च सर्वेभ्यः स्वाश्रयस्य विशेषणात् ।
व्यावृत्तिबुद्धिहेतुत्वं तेषामेव ततः स्थितम् ॥ ७११ ॥

tatreyaṃ dvividhā jātiḥ parairabhyupagamyate |
sāmānyameva sattākhyaṃ samasteṣvanuvṛttitaḥ || 709 ||
dravyatvādi tu sāmānyaṃ sadviśeṣo'bhidhīyate |
svāśrayeṣvanuvṛttasya cetaso hetubhāvataḥ || 710 ||
vijātibhyaśca sarvebhyaḥ svāśrayasya viśeṣaṇāt |
vyāvṛttibuddhihetutvaṃ teṣāmeva tataḥ sthitam || 711 ||

The ‘universal’ is postulated by the other party in the following manner: “it is of two kinds—‘being’ is a ‘universal’ which is ‘universal’ only,—as it pervades over all things; ‘substance’ and the rest, while being ‘universals are also spoken of as ‘particulars’; because in regard to their own substrata, they become the cause of their comprehensive notion, and also serve to differentiate their substrata from all things belonging to other ‘universals’—and in this way they also become the cause of the exclusive notion of those substrata.”—(709-711)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Even though the ‘Universal’ has been discarded, yet the Author is desirous of putting forward special objections against it; and as until the character of the thing is known, a criticism of it is not possible, he proceeds to describe the character of the ‘Universal’ and the ‘Particular’:—[see verses 709-711 above]

The ‘Universal’ is of two kinds—the Higher and the Lower; ‘Being’ is the highest ‘Universal’; it is called ‘Universal’, ‘common’, because it forms the basis of only a comprehensive notion in regard to all its three substrata—Substance, Quality and Action; for this same reason it is not a ‘Particular’ at all.

The Lower kind of ‘Universal’ is in the form of ‘Substance’, ‘Action’ and so forth; this kind is called ‘Universal’ (Genus, Class) in so far as it is the basis of the comprehensive notion of its substrata, in the shape of Substances, etc.;—and though being ‘Universal’, it is also called ‘Particular’, in so far as it serves as the basis of the exclusive notion of its substratum as distinguished from things belonging to other ‘Universals’, For instance, in regard to Quality, there arise such exclusive notions as ‘it is not-Substance’, ‘it has no qualities’ and so forth; and the cause (basis) of these must consist in such ‘Universals’ as ‘Substance’ and ‘Quality’,—not in anything else; because there are no such things as ‘not-Substance’ and so forth. There is no incongruity in the same thing being both ‘universal’ and ‘particular’, when it is taken relatively to other things. This is what the Text means.—(709-711)