by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588
This page describes verse 692 of the Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita (8th century), including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: both dealing with philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattva-sangraha (aka Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 verses.
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:
क्षणक्षयिषु भावेषु कर्मोत्क्षेपाद्यसम्भवि ।
जातदेशे च्युतेरेव तदन्यप्राप्त्यसम्भवात् ॥ ६९२ ॥
kṣaṇakṣayiṣu bhāveṣu karmotkṣepādyasambhavi |
jātadeśe cyutereva tadanyaprāptyasambhavāt || 692 ||
In things that are in a ‘perpetual flux’, any action, in the shape of ‘throwing up’ and the like, is impossible; because it ceases at the very place where it is born, and hence it cannot get at any other place.—(692)
Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):
“The Sūtra on this point is—‘Going up, going down, contracting, expanding and moving—are the five Actions’,—Of these, going up is that act which is the cause of the Conjunction and Disjunction with upper and lower space (respectively). That is to say, when, by virtue of effort and such other agencies, there arises,—in some part of the body, or in some such solid substance as the clod of Earth which is connected with the body,—an action which becomes the cause of the conjunction of that thing (Limb or Clod) with the upper layers of Ākāśa, and also of its Disjunction with the lower layers of it,—that Action is called ‘going up—The Action which is the cause of effects contrary to these is ‘going down’.—When a straight object becomes curved, this Action is called ‘contracting’; as has been thus described:—When of a straight object like the arm, the foreparts in the shape of the Finger and the rest, become disjoined (separated) from the points of Ākāśa with which they have been in contact,—while the hind part still remains in contact with those points,—then the whole object in the shape of the Arm becomes curved; and this action is called ‘Contracting’.—When the Conjunction and Disjunction appear in a manner contrary to the one thus described, the whole object becomes straightened again; this Action is called ‘Expanding—That which becomes the cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions with several stray objects in diverse places, is the Action called ‘Going—The first four forms of Action are the cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions with well-defined parts of Space and Ākāśa, while Going brings about Conjunctions and Disjunctions with sundry points in space in various directions.—Thus there are only five kinds of Action. Such other actions as Going Round, Flowing, Evacuating and the like are all included under
‘Going’.—All these five kinds of Action are established as having their existence indicated by such effects as Conjunction and Disjunction subsisting in solid objects. Conjunction and Disjunction are the effects common to all Actions; this is what establishes the existence of the effects of Action. It is proved by direct Perception also; as has been thus described—‘Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority and Posteriority and Action subsist in coloured (solid) objects, and hence are perceptible to the Eye’ (Vaiśeṣika-sūtra).”
Such in brief is the scheme of the other Party.
As regards this, Conjunction and Disjunction having been already rejected, what has been put forward as the ‘Effect’ of Action cannot be admitted. If what is put forward as the Reason for postulating Action is its effect in the shape of such Conjunction and Disjunction as consist of being produced in juxtaposition and so forth,—even so, the Reason would be ‘fallible’ (and Inconclusive); because the concomitance of such Conjunction and Disjunction with Action is in nowise admitted (or proved).—On the other hand, the Reason is concomitant with the contrary of the Pro-bandum; so that it is also ‘Contradictory’.—If merely the existence of a Cause is meant to be proved, then the Reasoning is superfluous; because the fact of Air and such other things being the cause of the said Conjunction and Disjunction is accepted by us also.—If a particular character (of the Cause) be meant to be proved, then the Conclusion is annulled by Inference. For instance, when the Action appears in a Substance, does it appear in a momentary substance? Or in a non-momentary (permanent) substance? It cannot appear in the momentary substance, because it ceases to exist—becomes destroyed—at the very spot where it comes into existence, and hence it cannot get at any other spot. This Inference may be formulated as follows:—When a thing ceases to exist at a certain spot, it cannot subsequently get at any other spot,—e.g. the Lamp and such things;—all the things in question do cease at the very spot where they come into existence;—hence there is an apprehension which is contrary to a character wider than the one desired to be proved (by the opposite party).—(692)