The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 677-678 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 677-678.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

सङ्ख्यायोगादयः सर्वे न द्रव्याव्यतिरेकिणः ।
तद्व्यवच्छेदकत्वेन दण्डादिरिव चेन्मतम् ॥ ६७७ ॥
तेषां संवृतिसत्त्वेन वर्णनादिष्टसाधनम् ।
तत्त्वान्यत्वेन निर्वाच्यं नैव संवृतिसद्यतः ॥ ६७८ ॥

saṅkhyāyogādayaḥ sarve na dravyāvyatirekiṇaḥ |
tadvyavacchedakatvena daṇḍādiriva cenmatam || 677 ||
teṣāṃ saṃvṛtisattvena varṇanādiṣṭasādhanam |
tattvānyatvena nirvācyaṃ naiva saṃvṛtisadyataḥ || 678 ||

If it be held that—“number, conjunction and the rest cannot be non-different from substance, because they serve to characterise and differentiate this latter,—like the stick”,—then [our answer is that] there is proving of what is admitted by us, if what is meant is that they have an ‘illusory existence’; because what is ‘imaginary’ cannot be defined either as ‘this’ or ‘not this—(677-678)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

With the following Texts, the Author anticipates and answers the arguments adduced in favour of such qualities as ‘Number’ and the rest:—[see verses 677-678 above]

Says the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika—“All the above-mentioned qualities, Number and the rest, cannot be non-different from Substance,—because they serve to characterise and differentiate Substances;—when one thing differentiates another, it cannot be non-different from the latter,—just as the stick, which differentiates Devadatta, cannot be the same as Devadatta.” If what is meant to prove by this argument is simply the denial of these being the same as Substance, then it is open to the charge of being futile. Because all things that have an ‘illusory or imaginary existence’ are nonentities, and as such it cannot be asserted in regard to them as to whether they are the same as, or different from, anything. And this is what is admitted by us also.—(677-678)

The following Text anticipates the Answer given to the above by Aviddhakarṇa;—[see verse 679 next]

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