The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 651 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 651.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अपोद्धारव्यवहृतिः पृथक्त्वाद्या तु कल्प्यते ।
कारणात्सा विभिन्नात्मभावनिष्ठा न किं मता ॥ ६५१ ॥

apoddhāravyavahṛtiḥ pṛthaktvādyā tu kalpyate |
kāraṇātsā vibhinnātmabhāvaniṣṭhā na kiṃ matā || 651 ||

The notion of ‘being apart’, which is assumed as being due to the quality of ‘separateness’,—why has it not been held to rest in the various things of divergent characters?—(651)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

“There is the notion that ‘this is separate from that’; and on the strength of this notion even a thing that is in contact with another thing is differentiated from it;—and that which is the cause or basis of this differentiation is called ‘Separateness’ (a distinct Quality—according to the Naiyāyikas). This ‘Separateness’ is something different from the Jar and other things,—because it forms the object of a cognition different from the cognition of these latter, as in the case dealt with before.”

Such is the view of the other party (the Naiyāyika). Here also, as in the case of ‘Dimension’, the Reason is open to the charge of being ‘Unproven’ and ‘Inconclusive—With this idea in his mind, the Author adds the following—[see verse 651 above]

That is to say, as a matter of fact, no such thing as ‘Separateness’ as distinct from Colour, etc. ever appears in Perception; so that the fact of its being cognised by a cognition different from the cognition of Colour, etc. cannot he admitted. Hence inasmuch as, while being perceptible, the intended quality is not perceived, it must be taken to be non-existent.—Nor can it be regarded as proved by the definite cognition ‘this is separate’, Because those same things, Colour and the rest,—existing in their own character—when conceived of in relation to other things, from which they are found to be differentiated,—become the basis of the notion of the things being ‘separate’; and hence the said notion cannot prove the existence of any other thing (apart from those things themselves).—Hence the notion of ‘being apart’, which is described as proceeding from the quality of ‘separateness’,—why cannot that notion be held to rest in heterogeneous and homogeneous characters? That is, it is best to regard it as resting upon that. This shows the ‘inconclusiveness’ of the Reason adduced by the other party. The compound ‘vibhinna, etcis to be expounded accordingly.—(651)

The following Text proceeds to show that the Reason cited is present in the contrary of the Probandum also:—[see verse 652 next]

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