The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 650 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 650.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

प्रासादश्चेष्यते योगो गुणः सोऽपरिमाणवान् ।
न तस्यास्त्यपरा माला नोपचारस्य चाश्रयः ॥ ६५० ॥

prāsādaśceṣyate yogo guṇaḥ so'parimāṇavān |
na tasyāstyaparā mālā nopacārasya cāśrayaḥ || 650 ||

The ‘palace’ is held by you to be a ‘conglomeration’, which is a quality; which, as such, cannot have dimension (which is another quality); nor can there be another ‘line’ of it. Nor can recourse be had to figurative expression.—(650)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

That is to say, you regard the ‘Palace’ to be of the nature of Conjunction, Conglomeration, and hence a Quality; and not a composite substance, as it is not productive of heterogeneous substances. The said Quality cannot have Dimension; because your doctrine is that Qualities cannot reside in Qualities. For the same reason the Palace, which is one quality, cannot have a ‘line’ (or series), winch is another quality; the expression ‘line of Palaces’ itself would be an absurdity; whence then could it be ‘large’ or ‘small’? To explain further—‘Line’ (series) is held to be of the nature of ‘Number’; and Number, as a Quality, can subsist only in a Substance, never in a Quality.—Even if ‘line’ or ‘series’ be regarded as of the nature of a ‘Composite’,—even so, the substratum of a Substance must be a Substance, not a Quality; so that the Line (a Substance) cannot subsist in the Palace (a Quality).—If ‘Line’ be held to be of the nature of Genus,—even so, as the Genus subsists in its complete form in every one of its component Individuals, even a single Palace could be called a ‘Line’,—like the Tree. This has been thus asserted—‘Though the House is a Conglomeration (Conjunction), how can there be a line of it? If it were a genus, then even a single Palace might be called a Line—With regard to the Line (series) also, the notion of ‘Long’, ‘Large’ and so forth is equally impossible; as in the Palace, of which it is a substratum, the quality of ‘one-ness’ and the like is not present; and as regards the Wood and other materials (that go to make up the Palace), the intended Length, etc. are absent in them.

Then again, when there are several ‘Lines of Palaces’, it would not be possible to have the notion of ‘Line’ and ‘Line’ extending over all; as one genus cannot have another genus. This has been thus asserted—‘Where there are several Lines, how can that term be applied? The genus cannot have another genus

Nor can it be right to seek shelter under ‘figurative expression’; as the notion of ‘largeness’ is not found to be fallible in reference to things like the Line; and hence it cannot be regarded as figurative. What is not different from the direct connotation cannot be regarded as ‘figurative’; otherwise it would lead to absurdities. This has been thus declared—‘The notion of Largeness in regard to the Line, which has been held to be figurative, cannot be figurative, as it is the object of a Cognition which is in no way different from the direct connotation of the term’,—(650)

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