Verse 642-643

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अस्तुनामैवमेकत्र ज्ञाने व्याप्ति(द्व्यादि ?)मतिस्तु कम् ।
एतेष्वपेक्षते हेतुं षट्पदार्थादिकेषु वा ॥ ६४२ ॥
एकार्थसमवायादेर्गौणोऽयं प्रत्ययो भवन् ।
तथा च स्खलितो यस्मान्माणवेऽनलबुद्धिवत् ॥ ६४३ ॥

astunāmaivamekatra jñāne vyāpti(dvyādi ?)matistu kam |
eteṣvapekṣate hetuṃ ṣaṭpadārthādikeṣu vā || 642 ||
ekārthasamavāyādergauṇo'yaṃ pratyayo bhavan |
tathā ca skhalito yasmānmāṇave'nalabuddhivat || 643 ||

The number ‘one’ may subsist in the one cognition; but on what basis does the notion of ‘two’ proceed, in reference to cognitions? Or even in regard to the ‘six categories’ and the rest?—The notion too of its ‘subsisting in the same thing’ can only be figurative, and hence fallible,—like the notion of ‘fire’ in regard to the boy.—(642-643)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

If the notion of ‘one-ness’ is due to subsistence in the same substance,.—then it may be so in regard to one Cognition, as also to Pleasure and the rest,—in which case the notion of ‘one’ is due to their subsisting in the same substance ‘Soul’ (which is one);—but what would the basis of such notions as ‘two cognitions’, ‘three Cognitions’ and the like? Certainly duality, etc, do not subsist in the Soul (in which the Cognition subsists).

The assertion too that is made,—such as ‘Six Categories’, ‘the two, Pleasure and Pain’, ‘the two, Desire and Hatred’, ‘Five kinds of Action’, ‘Two kinds of Genus, the Higher and the Lower’, ‘One Being’, ‘One Subsistence’ and so forth,—what would be the basis for such notions ? In these cases, there is no Number subsisting in the same thing.—So that this assumption also is not comprehensive enough; hence it cannot be right.

Further, ‘Subsistence in the sameng’ and such other basis, are asserted; and yet the notion of such subsistence, even if it appeared, could be only figurative,—because there are no other things; and hence the notions would be fallible; just like the notion of ‘Fire’ in regard to the Boy, where there is no real ground for applying the word to him. And, yet the notion is not fallible. So that the objection urged above still remains in force.—(642-643)