Verse 614-618

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

स्वातन्त्र्येण प्रसङ्गेन साधनं यत्प्रवर्त्तते ।
स्वयं तदुपलब्धौ हि सत्यं सङ्गच्छते न तु ॥ ६१४ ॥
नच कार्त्स्न्यैकदेशाभ्यां वृत्तिः क्वचन लक्षिता ।
यस्या असंभवाद्द्रव्यमसत्स्यादपरोऽपि च ॥ ६१५ ॥
दृष्टौ वा क्वचिदेतस्या द्रव्यादावनिवारणम् ।
अथ तस्मिन्नदृष्टौ तु भेदे प्रश्नो न युज्यते ॥ ६१६ ॥
एतावत्तु भवेद्वाच्यं वृत्तिर्नास्तीति तच्च न ।
युक्तं प्रत्यक्षतः सिद्धेरिहेदमिति बुद्धितः ॥ ६१७ ॥
प्रत्यक्षं न तदिष्टं चेद्बाधकं किञ्चिदुच्यताम् ।
रूपादिचेतसोऽपि स्यान्नैव प्रत्यक्षताऽन्यथा ॥ ६१८ ॥

svātantryeṇa prasaṅgena sādhanaṃ yatpravarttate |
svayaṃ tadupalabdhau hi satyaṃ saṅgacchate na tu || 614 ||
naca kārtsnyaikadeśābhyāṃ vṛttiḥ kvacana lakṣitā |
yasyā asaṃbhavāddravyamasatsyādaparo'pi ca || 615 ||
dṛṣṭau vā kvacidetasyā dravyādāvanivāraṇam |
atha tasminnadṛṣṭau tu bhede praśno na yujyate || 616 ||
etāvattu bhavedvācyaṃ vṛttirnāstīti tacca na |
yuktaṃ pratyakṣataḥ siddherihedamiti buddhitaḥ || 617 ||
pratyakṣaṃ na tadiṣṭaṃ cedbādhakaṃ kiñciducyatām |
rūpādicetaso'pi syānnaiva pratyakṣatā'nyathā || 618 ||

“Whenever a reason is adduced,—either directly or in the form of a reductio ad absurdum,—it becomes truly applicable only when it is itself apprehended;—not otherwise.—As a matter of fact, subsistence either in whole or in part has never been perceived (by you, buddhists),—on the basis of the impossibility of which in the substance, the substance could be held to be non-existent, or something else—if, on the other hand, such subsistence has been perceived by you anywhere, then it cannot be denied in the case of the substance and such things.—If the said subsistence has not been perceived, then the question does not arise regarding the distinction; all that could be asserted would be that ‘the subsistence is not there’, and this would not be right; as it is something directly perceived; as is clear in such notions as ‘this subsists here’.—If it be held that ‘the fact of this being direct perception is not admitted’, then some annulling reasoning should be put forward. Otherwise, even such cognitions as those of colour and such things might cease to be of the nature of ‘perception’.”—(614-618)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Śaṅkarasvāmin argues as follows:—“Whenever a Reason is adduced,—either directly or in the form of a Reductio ad absurdum,—it becomes applicable only when it is itself perceived; otherwise it would be open to the charge of being ‘unproven’,—As a matter of fact, you have not anywhere perceived the subsistence of anything either in its entirety or in part;—hence on the basis of the absence of such subsistence, it does not behove you to regard the (composite) substance as non-existent. Or—if it were possible—then there would be something else—Component and Composite.

If such subsistence has been perceived by you anywhere, then it could be the same in the ease of the Substance, etc. also, which, therefore, cannot be denied.—If, however, the said subsistence has not been perceived, then there does not arise any question regarding the distinction—as to whether the subsistence is in entirety or in part; because it is only when the object itself has been admitted that anything can be denied in regard to it. When however the object itself is not admitted, then it is better to deny the object itself,—so that the assertion should be in the form that ‘there is no subsistence’,—and not the denial of any particular character in regard to it. But such an assertion—as that ‘there is no subsistence at all’—would not be proper; because the subsistence of the Composite in the components is vouched for by direct Perception.

Question:—What is that Perception?

“Answer:—It is in the form ‘This subsists here’;—i.e. the Perception is in the form—‘This—Cloth—subsists in the yarns’,

“It might be argued that this notion cannot be regarded as Perception.

“In that case, it behoves you to put forward some reasoning in annulment of the said notion; whereby its perceptional character could be rejected. If, even in the absence of such annulling Reason, the notion be not accepted as ‘Perception’, then, your cognition of even such things as colour and the like would not be Perception; as there can be no difference between the two cases.”—(614-618)

The Author answers the above in the following—[see verse 619 next]