The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 605-606 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 605-606.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

एकावयव्यनुगता नैव तन्तुकरादयः ।
अनेकत्वाद्यथासिद्धाः कटकुट्यकुटादयः ॥ ६०५ ॥
यदि वाभिमतं द्रव्यं नानेकावयवाश्रितम् ।
एकत्वादणुवद्वृत्तेरयुक्तिर्बाधिका प्रमा ॥ ६०६ ॥

ekāvayavyanugatā naiva tantukarādayaḥ |
anekatvādyathāsiddhāḥ kaṭakuṭyakuṭādayaḥ || 605 ||
yadi vābhimataṃ dravyaṃ nānekāvayavāśritam |
ekatvādaṇuvadvṛtterayuktirbādhikā pramā || 606 ||

(A) such things as the yarns and the hand and other limbs cannot be permeated by any single ‘composite’,—because they are more than one,—like such well-known things as straw, hut and jar.—or (B)—the substance in question cannot subsist in several components,—because it is one,—like the atom.—And (C) impossibility of subsistence would be the proof annulling the other party’s proposition.—(605-606)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has thus been established in a general way that there can be no single gross substance, either made up, or not made up, of component parts. The Author now proceeds to point out the weak points in the notion of that of which the composite is held to be made up:—[see verses 605-606 above]

The arguments are to be formulated as follows:—

(A) That which is diverse cannot be permeated by a single substance,—e.g. the Jar, the Hut and many other things which are many are not permeated by any single substance;—the components in question, such as the yams, the Hand and other Limbs of the body and so forth, are diverse;—hence there is found in these a character which is contrary to the larger term of the Opponent’s proposition (i.e. to the components being permeated by the single composite).

Or, (B) What is one must subsist in a single substance,—like the single Atom;—and the substance called ‘composite’ is one;—hence there is found a character incompatible with the larger predicate of the Opponent’s proposition.—This is an argument in the form of a reductio ad absurdum.

(C) In support of both the above arguments, the author adduces a proof annulling the contrary of the Buddhist’s conclusion—‘Impossibility of subsistence, etc. etc.’;—i.e. the fact that the subsistence of the composite in the components cannot be explained on the basis of any means of Right Cognition serves to annul the conclusion (of the other party).—(605-606)

Question:—“Why should there be this impossibility?”

Answer:—[see verses 607-608 next]

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