The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 601-602 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 601-602.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

ननु चानंशके द्रव्ये किमव्याप्तं व्यवस्थितम् ।
स्वरूपं तदवस्थाने भेदः सिद्धोऽतएव वा ॥ ६०१ ॥
बहुदेशस्थितिस्तेन नैवैकस्मिन्कृतास्पदा ।
ततः सिद्धा पटादीनामणुभ्योऽनेकरूपता ॥ ६०२ ॥

nanu cānaṃśake dravye kimavyāptaṃ vyavasthitam |
svarūpaṃ tadavasthāne bhedaḥ siddho'taeva vā || 601 ||
bahudeśasthitistena naivaikasminkṛtāspadā |
tataḥ siddhā paṭādīnāmaṇubhyo'nekarūpatā || 602 ||

When the substance has no parts, what form would be there that would not be embraced (by the conjunction)? If such an (unembraced) form of the substance remained there, then diversity becomes established.—Existence in several places is not possible for any single object. hence it becomes established that things like the cloth are different in form from the atoms (composing them).—(601-602)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

If the Cloth is a single substance, then in such an impartite substance, what is it that would not be embraced by the Red Colour, by virtue of which the contact of the colour would be not-pervasive? If it is admitted that there is something left unpervaded by the colour, then that alone suffices to establish difference between the two parts,—as it would be impossible for the mutually contradictory pervaded and unpervaded parts to belong to one and the same thing. Nor would it be possible to explain that one part—the one covered by the Colour,—is larger than the other; because the thing has no parts. Otherwise, as all such diverse things as Water, Animal, Elephant and the like would be equally one only, there would be no difference among them and hence there could be no such differentiation as that between ‘large’ and ‘small’.

“The difference would be due to the one being made up of a larger number of component parts than the other.”

In that case, those parts themselves, appearing in larger or smaller numbers, may be the basis of the notions of ‘gross’ and ‘subtle’,—what is the use of postulating a ‘composite’ made up of those components, specially when these latter have not been found to be effective at all?

As a matter of fact, even when there are large and small number of component parts in things, that cannot constitute a difference among the composites themselves, as these latter are impartite; so that there can be no basis for differentiation into ‘gross’ and ‘subtle’. If the difference were held to be based upon the larger and smaller number of components, that would only imply the admission of the components, as the notion of ‘gross’ and ‘subtle’ would be applicable to these alone; and that would mean that the Atom is the only entity; nothing apart from the Atom, either gross or subtle, being perceived at all.

Then again, what is the meaning of the assertion that “Conjunction is not all-pervasive”?—If it means that it does not pervade over all (whole) of the substance,—then it cannot be right; because it has been held that the term ‘all’ cannot apply to the substance.—If it means that “Conjunction subsists only in a part of its substratum”,—that also cannot be right; as there can be no ‘part’ of it.—It may be said that what is meant is that “it subsists in a component making up the substance”;—if that be so, then, inasmuch as what has been coloured are only the components (where alone the contact of the Dye subsists), the colour of the composite would not be red at all; so that what should be perceived should be coloured and not-coloured, at one and the same time.—Further, what is called ‘the component making up the substance’,—if that is of the same form as the composite itself,—then the Conjunction that would subsist there would also subsist only in a part of that component (as Conjunction is non-pervasive, ex hypothesi); so that the objection would be equally applicable to this also.—If, on the other hand, the component be held to be of the form of the Atom, then, inasmuch as Atoms are beyond the reach of the senses, the Conjunction subsisting therein would also be beyond the reach of the senses; so that there could be no perception of the Red colour at all.

The Opponent might argue thus:—“Pervasion is the name given to that character whereby the shape of the finger is perceived only on the perception of the whole finger; hence when Conjunction is said to be not-pervasive, what is meant is that in its case it is not that it is perceived only on the perception of its substratum”.

This is not right. As a matter of fact, Conjunction is never perceived while its substratum is not perceived; e.g. the Conjunction between the Jar and the Ghost (which is not perceived because the Ghost is not seen). Thus then, under this explanation, the colour also would not be perceived; it should be regarded to be perceptible only when its substratum is perceived; and hence that also would be pervasive in character.

Says the Opponent:—“Even when the substance inhering (subsisting) in the other un-coloured components is perceived, there is no perception of the colour, which consists in Conjunction; hence even when its substratum (in the form of the substance) is perceived, the Conjunction is not perceived [and this is what makes it non-pervasive in character]

This is not right. In this way, there being only one substance inhering in, components some of which are coloured and some un-coloured,—even though a component might be coloured, the Colour would be not-perceived (in the Thing) through that perception of colour; because even though the substratum would be perceptible, the colour would be imperceptible. Nor is there any other way of perceiving the Conjunction, except the perception of its substratum.

From all this it follows that there is no ‘object’ which is of one form. Even when of various forms,—on the strength of being itself,—the difference can lie only in the form of the aggregation of Atoms; specially as the number of possible components can never be one.

Thus it is proved that the Jar and such things exist only in the form of Atoms; and hence the Blue and the rest form the shape of the Atoms; there being no other ‘single object’ possible.—(601-602)

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