The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 593-594 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 593-594.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

स्थूलस्यैकस्वभावत्वे मक्षिकापदमात्रतः ।
पिधाने पिहितं सर्वमासज्येताविभागतः ॥ ५९३ ॥
रक्ते च भाग एकस्मिन्सर्वं रज्येत रक्तवत् ।
विरुद्धधर्मभावे वा नानात्वमनुषज्यते ॥ ५९४ ॥

sthūlasyaikasvabhāvatve makṣikāpadamātrataḥ |
pidhāne pihitaṃ sarvamāsajyetāvibhāgataḥ || 593 ||
rakte ca bhāga ekasminsarvaṃ rajyeta raktavat |
viruddhadharmabhāve vā nānātvamanuṣajyate || 594 ||

If the gross object were op the nature of one only, then on even part op it being covered by the little leg op a plea, all of it would become covered, without any distinction;—and on one part op it being reddened, all of it would become coloured red.—Or, on the contrary, the presence op incompatible properties would indicate multiplicity.—(593-594)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

If the gross object were one, then the covering of one part of it would mean the covering of all of it, and the colouring of one part would mean the colouring of all; as, according to your view, there would be no difference between the covered and uncovered parts, or between the coloured and uncoloured parts. And yet it is not possible for any single object to be possessed of contradictory properties,—as that would lead to absurdities. Thus the whole universe would become a single substance; and this would involve all the anomalies of simultaneous production of things and the rest. As a matter of fact too, the covering of one part is not seen to lead to the covering of all. Thus the said view is clearly incompatible with perceived facts.

It is incompatible with Inference also: For instance, that which is obsessed by contradictory properties cannot be one,—e.g. the Cow and the Buffalo;—the gross object is found to be obsessed by the contradictory properties of being perceived and not perceived, as being ‘covered’ and ‘not covered’;—hence there is found in it the contrary of the wider condition, [which makes one-ness impossible].—The contingency of the whole universe becoming one would be an Inference that would annul the notion [of the said one-ness of the gross object].—(593-594)

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